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INTRODUCTION 
When anthropologist Henry Sumner Maine issued his famous 
proclamation that modern legal development evolved "from Status to 
Contract,"1 he used juridical categories to make a statement about 
progress. Voluntary relations now build the law, Maine declared. The 
alternative to voluntary relations - identity-based legal labels to de­
cree what people may and may not do - must relocate to the dustbin 
of history. Only a backwater society would keep them. 
American legal change in the century-plus since Maine's death in 
1888 gives credence to the claim that status inexorably yields to con­
tract. At one level, newer developments refute the Maine thesis. 
"Stalkers," "telemarketers," "date rapists," "reciprocal beneficiaries," 
"surrogate mothers," and other noun-phrases have joined the roster of 
what the law recognizes as shorthand for duties, entitlements, and li­
ability.2 Labels continue to emerge; rights and obligations attached to 
them flourish. Meanwhile older status roles like "tenant," "landlord," 
and "employer" have acquired more legal force, rather than less, in 
the last dozen decades.3 
Good reasons support the use of status as an instrument for law­
making and law enforcement: whether ancient or newly coined, status 
labels today tell individuals what the law permits and forbids. They 
pack meanings into a word or two. The phrase "dependent child," for 
instance, makes it clear that somebody - at least one person - can be 
prosecuted for not coming up with food and shelter. Designations like 
"owner," "felon," "attorney of record," or "residual legatee" are 
worth fighting over in court. Law would be verbose if not incoherent 
1. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY 
HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Ashley Montagu ed., 
Univ. of Ariz. Press 1986) (1864). 
2. See Cook v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 725, 730 (D. Minn. 1994) (referring 
to a "  'date' rapist"); Doe v. Keane, 658 F. Supp. 216, 221-22 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (analyzing 
the status of "surrogate mothers"); Guth v. Freeland, 28 P.3d 982, 995 n.6 (Haw. 2001) (re­
ferring to "reciprocal beneficiaries"); R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 791 (Mass. 1998) (noting 
"surrogate parent[s]"); State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Minn. 1996) (defining "stalker"); 
Charvat v. Dispatch Consumer Serv., 769 N.E.2d 829, 830-31 (Ohio 2002) (describing 
"telemarketer" regulations). 
3. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Postmodern Family Law: Toward a New Model of Status, in 
PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 157, 167 (David 
Popenoe et al. eds., 1996). 
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without the swift, compact punch of a legal label. If status is holding 
strong in the law, one need not wonder why any label-category is still 
with us. All statuses might be burgeoning. 
"From Status to Contract," however, challenges the existence of 
state-sponsored marriage. Maine's contention that Status is primitive 
and Contract modern reminds us that marital status is critically differ­
ent from other legal statuses that have been thriving. Becoming a 
"stalker" or a "surrogate mother" fits the Maine progression: it looks 
like Contract rather than Status. The terms connote episodes or par­
cels of individual lives, rather than a comprehensive social identity. A 
person can put on the label and take it off with little formality. By con­
trast the status of marriage - becoming, or ceasing to be, a wife or a 
husband - spreads into the far corners of one's life. Marriage is dif­
ferent also from the other key status category of family law - parent­
hood - in that the relation between parent and child addresses a rela­
tively clear and uncontroverted need. Infants cannot survive without 
resources from adults. A husband or wife can provide care to a 
dependent spouse, but care for dependents is not a defining condition 
of the marital relation,4 as it is of parenthood. Marriage, in short, is a 
peculiar status.5 Most other legal statuses relate directly either to 
episodes or transactions on the one hand ("agent," "mortgagee," 
"harasser") or dependency on the other ("parent," "guardian," per­
haps "fiduciary").6 
Law does have a history of recognizing a couple of personal, or 
comprehensive, statuses that do not fall into these two broad catego-
4. The common law doctrine of "necessaries" recognizes that a married person may be 
liable to creditors for some purchases that a spouse makes. This doctrine does not, however, 
mandate even financial support, let alone spousal caregiving. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & 
SUSAN F. APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 262 (2d ed. 2002). 
5. The marriage literature includes efforts to find a categorical label for this institution. 
See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT 13 (2000) (suggesting "cove­
nant" rather than status); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT xix (1981) 
("[M]arriage has moved from a status to a status-contract . . . . [M]arital partners have lost 
the traditional privileges of status and, at the same time, have been deprived of the freedom 
that the contract provides."). 
6. A key exception comes from business law, which offers "corporation" and "partner­
ship" among its statuses rooted in neither dependency nor transactions. See generally Martha 
M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 83 (2001) (noting that business partnerships, corporations, and limited 
liability companies "are similar to intimate relationships in that they have significant status 
elements that complement their contractual character"). I discuss the business-law analogy 
below. See infra Part IV.A.3. In conversation, Tony Dillof has suggested to me that the 
criminal-law concept of conspiracy is a legal status unrelated to dependency; liability for 
conspiracy, he notes, is so broad that it transcends episodes or transactions. Conversation 
with Tony Dillof, Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University School of Law, in 
Detroit, Mich. (Dec. 4, 2002). Marriage remains anomalous, however, because its status 
effects impose constraints on individuals, whereas a conspiracy is severable from individual 
conspirators. 
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ries of transaction and dependency. Such statuses partake of tautology. 
They are what they are; they must be because they have been. Legal 
consequences follow to status-bearers without consent; only a rare 
person who acquires a comprehensive status understands what it 
means before the label is bestowed.7 These labels are hard to shed. 
Principal examples of this kind of status are race - a legal category 
still not extinguished - and coverture, the set of disabilities that used 
to shackle most women. And then there are the categories that come 
from binary gender, where each person is assigned one (and only one) 
of two (and only two) legal statuses. The anti-individualistic, choice­
denying nature of these comprehensive statuses has clashed with pro­
gressive legal development.8 
It is in the law of marriage that the legal categories of "man" and 
"woman" retain their power. During the years when the government's 
distinguishing a woman from a man accreted disapproval in numerous 
legal realms - employment, military service, prisons, higher educa­
tion9 - a defense-of-marriage movement insisted on this distinction 
and engraved it into federal and state statutory law. Marriage, in fed­
eral law and in most states, must consist of a dimorphous pair, "one 
man and one woman. "10 
7. Such legal labels are not easy even for specialist scholars to spell out. Race, for in­
stance, has no canonical definition in the law. Marriage has been defined as "some sort of 
relationship between two individuals, of indeterminate duration, involving some kind of 
sexual conduct, entailing vague mutual property and support obligations, a relationship 
which may be formed by consent of both parties and dissolved at the will of either." 1 
HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.1, 
at 81 (2d ed. 1987); see also Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to 
Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1482-83 (2001) (noting that marrying 
means plunging "blindly into legal relationships" that the parties "know little or nothing 
about"). 
8. Consider mental deficiency, once a locus of comprehensive statuses that the law dic­
tated and enforced. See, e.g., Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 213 n.1 (1905) (noting duties of 
"the guardian or trustee of a minor, insane person or idiot"); Thlocco v. Magnolia Petroleum 
Co., 141 F.2d 934, 938 (5th Cir. 1944) (quoting an Oklahoma statute stating that "[p)ersons 
of unsound mind within the meaning of this chapter are idiots, lunatics, and imbeciles"); 
Lynch v. Rosenthal, 396 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (explaining that "there are 
three classifications of subnormal mentality, to-wit: moron, low moron, and idiot; [and) 
plaintiff is a low moron"). Few lament the decline of these legal statuses. See infra notes 13-
16 and accompanying text. 
9. See, e.g. , United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) ("Focusing on the 
differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court 
must determine whether the proffered justification [for sex discrimination) is 'exceedingly 
persuasive.' The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State."); 
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 175-76 (1st Cir. 1996) (rejecting a university's argument 
that female students were participating in sports at a lower rate than male students because 
they lacked interest in athletic opportunities); Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia 
Dep't of Corr. v. D.C., 899 F. Supp. 659, 671-72 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that lesser educa­
tional and vocational opportunities for women inmates violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
10. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000); see also 
infra Part II.B.4 (describing the state-level counterparts, or "baby DOMAs"). 
134 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:129 
Here, then, is the lineup of statuses for human beings in contempo­
rary American law. On one side are the comprehensive labels: race 
and the successor to coverture, gender.11 On the other side are noun­
phrases tailored to respond either to dependency, or to something re­
sembling free choice in one's encounters. Where does marriage land? 
In this Article, I argue that marriage imbues individuals with a com­
prehensive legal status. It is not transactional. Nor is it targeted to ad­
dress dependency, although it may aid a dependent person inciden­
tally. Like race and coverture, the social category of marriage occupies 
space in the law, and not only in society. Also like race and coverture, 
marital status functions to elevate some individuals, and subordinate 
others, based on their membership in groups that they did not choose 
to join.12 
The condition of marriage in American law is noteworthy. Al­
though Maine-like reports of their death might be greatly exaggerated, 
most comprehensive legal statuses are on their way to oblivion in the 
United States. Race, once a category that signified either enslavement 
or the privilege to enslave others, and later a marker of privileges ei­
ther withheld or bestowed, such as where one could gather in public, 
or which schools one could attend, now exists almost nowhere in 
American law beyond "affirmative action," itself on the wane.13 
American law used to speak of lunatics and idiots; the status label now 
assigned to cover this ground, "disability," sees human variation in 
briskly functional and specific terms.14 According to the Supreme 
11. These two statuses do not exhaust the "comprehensive" list - one might add relig­
ion, alienage, and sexual orientation as comprehensive categories that have legal effects. 
These categories are, however, the most fundamental. 
12. Married adults generally have made a choice to marry, and stay married; the phrase 
"single by choice" implies that at least some adults opt not to marry. Nevertheless, the con­
sequences of marital status are not entirely chosen. Recipients of unchosen legal benefits and 
detriments related to marriage include children, whose entitlements can vary based on the 
marital status of their parents, see infra note 160; jilted partners and single-but-not-by-choice 
adults, who want to choose marriage but have not been chosen in tum, see infra notes 202-
210 and accompanying text; and persons coerced into marrying. See Mountholly v. 
Andover, 11 Vt. 226, 227-28 (Vt. 1839) (declaring a marriage void on the ground of coer­
cion); Brown v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 491, 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (referring to an earlier 
marriage of one of the parties that had been annulled on the ground of coercion). 
13. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (upholding race-conscious univer­
sity admissions with the hope "that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no 
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today"). 
14. American disability law has not achieved full enlightenment. See RUTH O'BRIEN, 
CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 
63-87 (2001) (faulting American disability law for its construct of a "whole man" ideal); 
Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 1279, 1283-84 (2000) (contending that the Supreme Court treats the disabled with 
disrespect). Nevertheless, progress in disability law has proceeded since the landmark 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000). As amended in 1974, this statute 
explicitly rejects "archaic attitudes and laws" in its encouragement of integration into the 
mainstream. S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 50 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6400. 
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Court, the government may not classify homosexually inclined persons 
as categorically less entitled to benefits that they obtain by democratic 
means.15 And "men" and "women" are rapidly exiting most of the law; 
"persons" take their place. Except in the law of marriage.16 
Should marriage, then, make an explicit transition from Status to 
Contract? If it opted to maximize the prerogatives of contract, this 
change would encourage the law to abandon its recognition of the sex­
ual, gender-dimorphous dyad.17 All domestic relations between adult 
individuals would be formed by issue-specific agreements.18 Family law 
would survive in order to regulate the care of children, but two would 
no longer become one in any legal sense. The law would intervene in a 
couple's life just as it now uses the law of contracts, torts, crimes, and 
property to moderate relations between any other adults. 
This idea has been floated, but not developed. Of the writers who 
have made proposals along these lines,19 Martha Fineman has offered 
15. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996). This Article uses "homosexually in­
clined" or "homosexually oriented," something of a mouthful, because terser terms ("gay," 
"queer," and the like) have connotations that are too precise to describe this broad category. 
16. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTIMACY 26-28, 
111-57 (1992) (arguing that marriage is one of many declining institutions that used to con­
trol sexuality and reproduction, and that marriage now approaches a "pure relationship" 
sustained only by the partners' individual wishes). 
17. Now, how exactly would the state proceed to end legal recognition of this dyad? The 
race, coverture, and mental-disability precedents provide an array of role models. State stat­
utes, the Emancipation Proclamation, and an accumulation of customary law contributed to 
abolishing the legal category of "slave." Courts and legislatures invalidated the de jure seg­
regation that followed emancipation. The Married Women's Property Acts began the elimi­
nation of coverture. Desuetude and shifts in public attitudes loosened the hold of statuses 
like "lunatic" and "idiot." I return to the mechanics of abolishing state-sponsored marriage 
below. See infra notes 348-360 and accompanying text. 
18. The question of what, after abolition, a court should do with a meta-agreement like 
"We, A and B, consent to be bound together as if we were married, in the pre-abolition 
sense of the term" complicates the abolition proposal a little. But not too much. One can 
imagine a body of intimate-contract law evolving on this question, just as corporate law 
evolved to recognize the open-ended nature of what a corporation may do. See Kent 
Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on 
How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1302-
13 (2001) (cataloguing the "rise and fall" of ultra vires, the doctrine that a corporation's 
powers are limited by its charter). Contract law has already pondered the enforceability of 
paradoxical contracts that waive freedom of contract; at least at this hypothetical level, 
Americans already live with the possibility of, for example, an agreement to live under 
eighteenth-century coverture law. Moreover, the subject is familiar: courts today must 
construe cohabitation contracts, antenuptial contracts, separation agreements, child custody 
agreements, and other knotty bargains between intimate partners. 
19. See, e.g., Dianne Post, Why Marriage Should Be Abolished, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L. 
REP. 283 (1997) (claiming that marriage is a disaster); Russell Smith, Marriage: Who Needs It 
Anyway?, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), May 23, 2003, at Rl ("Maybe marriage is a legal cate· 
gory we no longer need."); David Boaz, Privatize Marriage, SLATE, Apr. 25, 1997, at 
http://slate.msn.com!id/2440 ("Make [marriage] a private contract between two individu­
als."). Abolish-marriage scholars are mostly female, notwithstanding prevalent suspicions 
that 'Marxists' and their ilk, presumably including men, oppose the traditional family. 
136 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 102:129 
the most sustained attack on state-sponsored marriage.20 An expert in 
family law, Fineman focuses on what she sees as family law's true do­
main, the care and nurturing of dependents. Family law could evolve 
to deny marriage while acknowledging relation-based dependency, she 
argues.21 Whereas children come into the world inherently needy and 
helpless, those who do caregiving work within the family have their 
dependency - economic vulnerability, conflict between paid and un­
paid work, unequal bargaining power vis-a-vis their partners - im­
posed upon them: "Women are socially and culturally assigned de­
pendency."22 Thus state-sponsored marriage, to Fineman, is not a cure 
for the plight of dependent mothers. Marriage creates their plight. 
If Fineman is right to call dependency the center of, and the reason 
for, legal regulation of the family, and also right to call women's fa­
milial dependency on men a contingent and reparable condition and a 
problem that marriage makes worse, then the best rationale for state­
sponsored marriage is that it lassoes parents to their children: being 
married to one's fellow parent seems to strengthen the parental tie, 
particularly for fathers.23 So long as alternative means of yoking par-
Friedrich Engels pioneered unsentimental economic analysis of the family, for example, but 
did not call for the abolition of state-sponsored marriage. See JUNE CARBONE, FROM 
PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW 55-57 (2000) (summa­
rizing Engels). Nietzsche wrote, "Modern marriage has lost its meaning- consequently one 
abolishes it," FREDERICH NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 
544 (Walter Kaufmann trans. & ed., 1954), but did not say who abolishes it, how, or when. 
Lesbian legal scholars have expressed deep skepticism about marriage. See Patricia A. Cain, 
Imagine There's No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27 (1996); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Do­
mestic Partnership, Civil Unions, or Marriage: One Size Does Not Fit All, 64 ALB. L. REV. 
905 (2001); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Les­
bian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. 
L. REV. 1535 (1993); see also Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of Unmarried 
People in American Law, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 207 (1988) (advocating the elimination of privi­
leges and advantages that derive from state-sponsored marriage). 
20. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228 (1995) (contending that "we 
should abolish marriage as a legal category and with it any privilege based on sexual affilia­
tion"); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha Fineman, 8 AM. 
U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 167, 176 (2000) ("Abolish marriage as a legal category for 
everyone. Read Martha Fineman."). 
21. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY 
OF DEPENDENCY (2004). 
22. Martha Albertson Fineman, Symposium Comments, Divorce and Feminist Legal 
Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2521, 2522 (1994). 
23. Researchers frequently study never-married and divorced fathers, and find them 
absent from their children's lives, in comparison to married fathers. Michael E. Lamb, Plac­
ing Children's Interests First: Developmentally Appropriate Parenting Plans, 10 VA. J. Soc. 
POL'Y & L. 98, 108 (2002) (noting that divorced fathers are often absent, while "never­
married fathers are more than twice as likely as divorced fathers to have no contact with 
their children"); Barbara Stark, Guys and Dolls: Remedial Nurturing Skills in Post-Divorce 
Practice, Feminist Theory, and Family Law Doctrine, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 293, 372 n.394 
(1997) (summarizing studies finding that most divorced fathers "neither see nor support their 
November 2003) For and Against Marriage 137 
ents to children are untried as potential substitutes for marriage, and 
so long as a close relationship with parents contributes to the good of a 
child, the premise that state-sponsored marriage benefits children will 
retain some validity.24 But as a means to tie children to adults, mar­
riage is a crude, antiquated, at-most-second-best instrument. Offspring 
do not need their progenitors' union to be sanctioned by law for them 
to reap the benefits of a close link to their parents, now that relatively 
simple recordkeeping and genetic technology can connect parents with 
neonates and young children - the most significant set of dependents 
in any society - and assign legal status to that connection. New legis­
lation accompanying abolition could greatly increase the legal conse­
quences of acquiring the status of parent. Freed from monitoring sex­
ual affiliations, family law could spend its energies looking out for 
vulnerable people. Abolishing state-sponsored marriage would not 
ignore, eliminate, or increase dependency: on the contrary, it would 
force the law to recognize that dependents need care.25 
Abolishing marriage might not roil the surface of domestic life in 
practice. Without state-sponsored marriage, many households would 
likely resemble the married-with-children construct that dominates 
family life in the United States today.26 Two people - in most cases a 
pair that sees itself, and is seen, as gender-dimorphous - would form 
a durable relation grounded in mutual intimacy and love. They might 
choose to mark their union with rites and ceremonies. They would 
typically live together in one household and procreate. Each adult in 
the pair would feel related to the other; both would feel related to 
their offspring. Such households would include the legal statuses of 
"parents" and "children." But the dyad that came together as an adult 
children in a systematic way") (internal citation omitted). These findings are of limited value 
in predicting what father-child ties would look like if marriage were abolished. Although 
they support a conclusion that a formal, legal connection to a child's mother tends to 
strengthen a father's relationship with his child, they do not establish that such a connection 
is the best means of doing so, and do not take into account the costs of that connection. 
24. I discuss problems with this premise below. See infra Part 11.C.1 (noting the frequent 
confusion of correlation with causation so that, for instance, marriage is associated with 
beneficial effects in children when parental wealth probably deserves the credit); Part 111.C.4 
(exploring ways that state-sponsored marriage can be harmful to children). Consider also the 
well-being that parents and children experience outside of marriage in Europe, where non­
marital childbearing and childrearing enjoy considerable support: children in the marriage­
focused United States are much more likely than children in western Europe (and also in 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) to live in poverty. M.M. Slaughter, Fantasies: Single 
Mothers and Welfare Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2156, 2164-65 (1995) (reviewing FINEMAN, 
supra note 20). 
25. See infra Part 111.C.5 (arguing that the existence of marriage conceals caregiving 
labor). 
26. But see John T. Noonan, Jr., The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 255, 270 (1973) ("Without marriage, created by law, acknowledged by law, privileged 
by law, the family is a formless biological blob."). 
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couple would share no legal bond, no singular identity vis-a-vis third 
parties or the state. 
Could it happen? Although no constituency in the United States 
has mobilized against state-sponsored marriage,27 the coverture­
influenced fusion of two-into-one grows ever weaker in practice. Most 
Americans give marriage a try sometime during their lives, but indi­
viduals have also been withdrawing from marriage - a phenomenon 
expressed in a relatively high divorce rate and a rising average age 
of first marriage.28 These demographic changes suggest a reduction in 
the percentage of Americans who register with the state as half of a 
couple. 
Along with these changes, legislatures and courts have been re­
flecting and fostering a newer individualism in the law of marriage that 
has undermined the old two-into-one status.29 Divorce law, liberalized 
in the last few decades, has made unions easier and cheaper to escape. 
In less than thirty years state governments swerved from almost 
unanimously rejecting antenuptial contracts dividing marital property 
to almost unanimously enforcing them.30 Even traditionalist reforms 
that have appeared in recent years (such as the harder-to-exit "cove­
nant marriage" and premarital counseling imposed on applicants for 
marriage licenses), which are designed to strengthen marriages, focus 
more on the marrying individual as party to a contract and less on the 
27. The future may bring change. One pro-marriage initiative surveyed young adults and 
found that forty-five percent of them "agree that the government should not be involved in 
licensing marriage." NATIONAL MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2001, at 
13 (2001 ), available at http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/SOOU/NMP AR2001.pdf 
(May 2001). 
28. See ANDREW HACKER, MISMATCH: THE GROWING GULF BETWEEN WOMEN AND 
MEN 7 (2003); Michael A. Fletcher, For Better or Worse, Marriage Hits a Low, WASH. POST, 
July 2, 1999, at Al; see also Jeffrey Zaslow, Divorce Makes a Comeback, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
14, 2003, at Dl (noting that recent pro-marriage government initiatives seemed to be failing 
in 2003, as evidenced by a rising divorce rate). 
29. One scholar of family law has named this phenomenon "privatization." Jana B. 
Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1444. Commenting on a 
draft of this Article, law student Damon Karam reflected on a broader theme, manifest in 
contemporary American life: 
We are seeing sporting events billed as 'Shaq vs. Yao Ming' or 'Sammy Sosa vs. Barry 
Bonds' and their contracts reflect this shift towards individual focus. In the workplace, it 
seems as if every person employed by a company has a 'title,' from the CEO to the janitor. 
Whether right or wrong, it is the direction society has taken in virtually all facets, except 
marriage. 
Memorandum from Damon Karam to Anita Bernstein 2-3 (Feb. 27, 2003) (on file with the 
author). 
30. See Pendleton v. Fireman, 5 P.3d 839, 845-46 (Cal. 2000) (noting that forty-one juris­
dictions enforce such contracts, and relating this new stance to "changes in public policy and 
the attitude toward marriage"). 
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oneness of union.31 A number of state governments in the United 
States have decided to allow pairs of individuals to sign up for some of 
the benefits of legal marriage without imposing on these pairs any de­
mand to be gender-dimorphous or have a sexual bond.32 This innova­
tion understands law-based coupling as a choice that two adults can 
make, beyond mere compliance with an old imperative to build child­
producing households. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 
published by the American Law Institute in 2002 after more than a 
decade of work, suggests that when longstanding relationships end, the 
existence of formal law-based unions should count for nothing when 
courts assign rights and duties to individuals who separate. In other 
words, according to the Institute, the law for dissolving families should 
regard marriage as no different from extended cohabitation.33 Ameri­
can reformers keep an eye outside the United States, where same-sex 
couples have won full marriage rights, and look forward to a similar 
American movement away from the gender script.34 At least in the 
short term, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,35 the 2003 deci­
sion holding that the state of Massachusetts must provide marriage to 
same-sex couples, has begotten fragmentation and dissent rather than 
extended a monolithic condition to cover more people.36 Marrying -
and its important correlatives, repudiating marriage and being fore­
closed from it - now yields much less homogeneity. Back in 1861 
Henry Maine wrote that, starting "from a condition of society in which 
all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, 
we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in 
31. See Developments in the Law - The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1996, 2091 (2003) (noting strong contractual underpinnings of covenant marriage). 
32. See William C. Duncan, Whither Marriage in the Law?, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 19, 
122-24 (2002-2003) (describing "domestic partnership" in California, "reciprocal beneficiar­
ies" in Hawaii, and "civil unions" in Vermont); Joe Crea, Calif Law Would Grant Gays Most 
Rights of Marriage, S. VOICE, June 13, 2003, at 21 (reporting legislative initiative in Califor­
nia that would extend domestic-partnership law to grant "nearly all the rights of marriage"). 
33. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 6.05 
(2002). But cf Mark Hansen, A Family Law Fight, AB.A. J., June 2003, at 20, 23 (quoting 
critics who deem the ALI Principles destructive of marriage). 
34. See Laura Douglas-Brown, Belgium Becomes Second Country to Let Gays Marry, S. 
VOICE, Feb. 14, 2003, at 11 (noting recognition of same-sex marriage in Belgium and the 
Netherlands and increased status-protection for same-sex couples elsewhere in Europe, and 
quoting American activist-lawyer Evan Wolfson: "It's clear that we are riding a wave 
here . . .  (but] the United States is lagging behind."); Clifford Krauss, Now Free to Marry, 
Canada's Gays Say, "Do /?," N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003, § 1,  at 1 (reporting gay couples' 
reactions to the availability of marriage in Canada). 
35. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
36. Cass R. Sunstein, Federal Appeal, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 2003, at 21 (noting con­
troversies that accompany the Goodridge decision). 
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which all of these relations arise from the free agreement of individu­
als. "37 A century and a half later, his statement has become more true. 
The proposal to abolish state-sponsored marriage, then, comes af­
ter at least portents, if not out-and-out precedent, elsewhere in Ameri­
can legal change. Additional support for the proposal comes more 
generally from a focus on the individual as the locus reached, regu­
lated, and tutored by law. What happens to individuals is the measure 
of law's ambition and legitimacy. And more than ever, married people 
are individuals. In contrast to the common law of centuries past, 
American husbands do not sue in tort for their wives' injuries. When 
a wife commits the crime, she, not her husband, does the time. 
Marriages now contain separate personal property, and permit con­
tracting between the spouses. The persistence of a comprehensive le­
gal status that conjoins individuals into pairs - when in so many re­
spects each person is a solitary creature in the law - calls for 
evaluation. I undertake that evaluation in this Article. 
My account of state-sponsored marriage in the United States be­
gins in Part I with a primer on how federal and state law currently rec­
ognize this status. This legal recognition is far from static, and the last 
decade marked several pertinent changes in the law of marriage. The 
next Part links this pattern of law reform with a broader marriage 
movement. From their premise that marriage is both socially desirable 
and in need of shoring up, activists have encouraged both federal and 
state lawmakers to focus on marriage policy. These leaders have de­
ployed an influential "case for marriage," which I study in Part II, ex­
amining its arguments and its successes on the legal landscape. 
The proposal to abolish state-sponsored marriage puts this "case" 
in a fresh light. Activists promote marriage on the ground that it offers 
favorable contrasts to the alternatives to being married: singleness and 
nonmarital cohabitation. They link marriage with happier individual 
lives, a sense of the future that makes people willing to invest in their 
relationships, children who score higher on various indices, sexual con­
tentment, and longer life expectancy, among other "goods."38 With all 
these goods lying there waiting to be claimed, partisans would pursue 
without hesitation changes in the law that encourage and reward mar­
rying. But welfare disparities between the married and unmarried 
could be eliminated more effectively. Under abolition, "singleness," 
"cohabitation," and "marriage" would lose their legal status, and in­
deed some of their meaning. 
In this context much of the "case for marriage" evaporates, be­
cause to date the "case" has contrasted being married only to being 
37. MAINE, supra note 1, at 163. 
38. See, e.g., John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1019, 1019-20 (2001). 
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divorced and to never marrying; it has never confronted state­
sponsored marriage as an option that right-thinking people might re­
ject on the same quasi-utilitarian basis that now commends getting 
married over not getting married. This lapse is forgivable: researchers 
like to focus on that which can be counted rather than on a counterfac­
tual hypothesis (especially one they can deem unrealistic).39 Harder to 
"imagine there's no marriage," as Patricia Cain has proposed.40 But 
marriage partisans, having broached a cost-benefit defense of the insti­
tution, open the door to imagining just that. The federal government 
alone - not to mention the dozens of state governments that follow 
similar policies - spends or declines to collect billions of dollars each 
year because of its recognition of marriage, as I detail in Part III. If 
state-sponsored marriage yields net payoffs for society - going be­
yond married individuals and their children - then these investments 
should certainly continue. If not, then they become questionable.41 I 
begin the bookkeeping.42 
The detriments of state-sponsored marriage can be laid out in 
three levels. At a primary level, as mentioned, the government directly 
forgoes revenue in consequence of its recognition of marriage. At a 
secondary level, the law's recognition of marriage mandates or facili­
tates behaviors that cause social losses. Such losses are more difficult 
to quantify than the primary detriments, but are linked closely to legal 
39. For instance, some demographers compare the earnings of married men with those 
of single men, and infer that marriage is good because the former group earns more. See 
Peter Cappelli et al., It Pays to Value Family: Work and Family Tradeoffs Reconsidered, 39 
INDUS. REL. 175 (2000); Megan M. Sweeney, Two Decades of Family Change: The Shifting 
Economic Foundations of Marriage, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 132 (2002). The same data would 
support different normative conclusions, including a proposal to abolish marriage on the 
ground that it is inegalitarian. Researchers nevertheless prefer the more "realistic" endorse­
ment of marriage as good - a recommendation that both individuals and policymakers can 
heed. 
40. Cain, supra note 19, at 27. 
41. Cf Martha Albertson Fineman, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of 
Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 89, 91 (1998) ("[M]oney need not actually change hands 
for a subsidy to exist."). 
42. The "bookkeeping" project resembles an endeavor pursued in the media during the 
spring of 2003: trying to identify the true costs of war in Iraq. Politicians' pre-war estimates 
of the necessary appropriations ranged from $200 billion to $2 trillion. Jurgen Brauer, 
Economist: Achieve War Goal with Ledger Book, Not Laser Bombs, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
Mar. 3, 2003, at A7. "Bookkeeping" arguments are familiar; many writers seek to expand the 
concept of truthful accounts in policymaking: according to one, economists are inclined to 
"look at all costs, budgetary and otherwise." Id.; see also Eva Feder Kittay, A Feminist Pub­
lic Ethic of Care Meets the New Communitarian Family Policy, 111 ETHICS 523, 546-57 (2001) 
(contending that "dependency work" and harm to the environment can be subjected to im­
proved cost-benefit accounting). I have argued that better "bookkeeping" might enhance 
both tort law and international human rights law. Anita B ernstein, Conjoining International 
Human Rights Law with Enterprise Liability for Accidents, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 
382, 403-04 (2001) (characterizing the torts concept of cost internalization as "honest 
bookkeeping"). 
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rules and institutions. At a tertiary level, norms and conventions asso­
ciated with state-sponsored marriage create detriments. 
In calling this review "bookkeeping," I do not say that state­
sponsored marriage has an exact price that an auditor can quantify. 
Instead, the review brings a crucial missing dimension to what advo­
cates have identified as a slam-dunk utilitarian case. Activists have 
achieved, and seek more, legislation; the value of legislation lies in the 
balance of improvement over detriment that it can accomplish.43 To 
the extent that marriage is a creature of the legislature, it ought to be 
on the books only if it makes the public better off. 
From this base, Part IV, "Revising the 'Case,' " undertakes a pre­
liminary defense of state-sponsored marriage that faces, rather than 
denies, the extensive social disutility that this legal institution fosters. 
Once marriage is identified as a source of losses that the "case for 
marriage" has failed to confront, those who would preserve state­
sponsored marriage need arguments beyond the facile and tautological 
quasi-utilitarianism that now dominates public analysis. Part IV re­
counts two cogent arguments for marriage. The first one claims that 
individuals need access to this status in order to flourish; the second 
claims that men must have access to marriage, both for their own good 
and the good of society. Without endorsing these arguments, I contrast 
them favorably to the inadequate "case"; they may not persuade, but 
they make sense given their own premises, even when compared to a 
society without marriage. 
The query that still needs to be framed, which I broach at the end 
of the Article, is: Compared to what? As an institution that imposes 
social control, marriage, though flawed and unjust, is better than its 
competitors. Ending status-based constraints in the law works well 
where the area governed does not need regulation: the erosion of race 
as a legal status offers a strong example of this kind of healthy disap­
pearance. Intimate lives, however, do appear to need some regulation, 
even when children are not present,44 and of all potential regulators -
the only alternatives are the state and the market - marriage offers 
the most compelling benefits. 
I .  MARRIAGE AS A LEGAL CATEGORY: A SURVEY OF THE LAW 
AT STAKE 
This Part considers the proposal to abolish state-sponsored mar­
riage by looking at its feasibility and consequences, raising two ques-
43. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London Althone 
Press 1970) (1879) Uustifying legislation in terms of producing happiness). 
44. I elaborate below. See infra text accompanying notes 342-355. 
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tions. First, would American law permit the abolition of state­
sponsored marriage? The answer is yes. Second, what would change? 
Numerous entitlements and duties mandated in federal and state law 
would be wiped off the books. 
A. The Constitutional Law of Marriage 
Reformers have learned that the United States Constitution is neu­
tral on the abolition of state-sponsored marriage. Although the Su­
preme Court has issued pronouncements on the importance of this 
institution,45 nothing in its decisional law requires the states or the fed­
eral government to continue recognizing marital status. Decisional law 
on marriage sets only a handful of constraints. Substantive due process 
limitations on government power prevent the state from arbitrarily 
withholding access to marriage from dual-gendered couples. The con­
stitutional guarantee of equal protection prevents the state from con­
ditioning access to marriage on classifications that lack a reason. These 
two categories provide all the constitutional law of marriage; no other 
constitutional doctrine gives citizens an entitlement to state recogni­
tion of the dyads they choose to form. 
1. Negative Liberties: The Constitutionality of the Abolition Process 
When it ceases to accept that two adults may fuse themselves to­
gether in the eyes of the law, the state is abstaining from action, rather 
than acting. The end of state-sponsored marriage is thus like the end 
of any other affirmative initiative in public welfare. Because the 
Supreme Court has long rejected demands for affirmative entitlements 
cast as constitutional rights - among them health care, government­
funded abortion, and education at a state-mandated level of quality46 
- the Court cannot rely on its precedents to recognize a constitutional 
right to be married in the eyes of the law. 
In this negative-liberties perspective, the government may abolish 
marriage if it does so without derogation of established due process 
and equal protection rights. Because the nullification of existing mar­
riages would serve to deprive married persons of quasi-property, or 
45. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (noting that marriage is "of 
fundamental importance"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942} (stating that mar­
riage is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"). 
46. See Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (abortion funding); San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37-39 (1973) (school financing); Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970) (welfare funding). 
One might argue that state-sponsored marriage is more like the "process" than the "sub­
stance" of funded entitlements. Even if this contention is correct, cf infra Part III (arguing 
that state-sponsored marriage is about money), the core of a procedural right is that it may 
not be allocated capriciously. The withdrawal of marriage from everyone avoids this pitfall. 
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impair their contracts, abolition as new legislative policy would pose 
fewer risks if it took place prospectively, with an effective date set well 
in the future. Alternatively, state-sponsored marriage could be al­
lowed to elapse through a slow evolution of public withdrawal and dis­
taste, rather than fiat. The abolition of marriage could not be re­
stricted to subgroups, or launched as an experiment that treats sub­
groups of Americans differently in violation of equal protection law. 
With negative-liberties safeguards in place, the retreat of marriage 
from American law would avoid inflicting legally cognizable harm on 
American citizens. 
2. Substantive Due Process 
When the Supreme Court referred to the Due Process Clause in 
invalidating a Virginia ban on interracial marriage, it noted that "[t]he 
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital per­
sonal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men."47 One might read this dictum from Loving v. Virginia as assur­
ing Americans some kind of automatic state recognition of their cou­
pling, at their behest. But the Loving Court took pains to guarantee no 
such thing. Immediately after siting the Lovings' right to marry in the 
Due Process Clause, the Court went on to add that it would be wrong 
to withhold marriage from them "on so unsupportable a basis" as ra­
cial classification.48 What Loving found unconstitutional, then, was not 
the foreclosing of marriage per se, but rather the baseless denial of 
marriage to a couple that had done nothing to deserve this singular 
deprivation.49 
As the Supreme Court has seen them, substantive due process 
rights have never included a right to obtain any governmental benefit 
or imprimatur, unless a litigant can contend that the government has 
been distributing this benefit to some recipients. There is no substan­
tive due process right to boons and gifts. According to case law, sub­
stantive due process in the context of marriage does not include a right 
47. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
48. Id. In other words, a fundamental right to marriage means that the state must have a 
compelling reason before it may interfere with the law-based coupling it recognizes, not that 
it must continue bestowing law-based recognition to couples. 
49. The Court's other marriage-as-a-fundamental right cases following Loving also indi­
cate that marriage may indeed be withheld for good reason. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 
78, 99 (1987) (deeming a Missouri rule prohibiting prison inmates from marrying "not rea­
sonably related to legitimate penological objectives," but noting that other restrictions on 
marriage would have been acceptable); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-90 (1978) 
(calling Wisconsin's withholding of marriage from persons in child support arrears poorly 
tailored to the problem of nonsupport). 
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to be declared the father of one's biological child,50 nor a right to know 
that one's wife is having an abortion,51 nor a right to impose a paternal 
surname on one's child.52 States may bestow and take away marriage­
related privileges, moreover, as they see fit.53 
3. Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection Clause served many litigants well when they 
pressed their right-to-marry claims in the Supreme Court. Loving v. 
Virginia,54 Zablocki v. Redhail,55 and Turner v. Safley56 held that an 
equal protection right, as well as a due process right, was violated 
when Richard Loving, Mildred Jeter, Roger Redhail, and Leonard 
Safley were prohibited from marrying. For litigants, the Equal Protec­
tion Clause has been integral to marriage as a constitutional right.57 
But it can say nothing against the obliteration of state-sponsored mar­
riages. That maneuver by government would take marriage away from 
everybody - not just prison inmates, or deadbeat parents, or couples 
who dare to defy a custom of racial division. Put another way, every 
equal protection claim needs a government classification, and the abo­
lition of state-sponsored marriage would lead to fewer classifications 
than now exist. 
A crucial equal protection decision in the annals of marriage case 
law, Eisenstadt v. Baird,58 specifically insisted in dicta that the state 
50. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 114, 129-30 (1989) (plurality opinion) (hold­
ing that a man lacked a constitutional right to be declared the father of a child when his pa­
ternity was established to 98.07% certainty). 
51. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992) (striking down various 
husband-notification requirements). 
52. Neal v. Neal, 941 S.W.2d 501, 503-04 (Mo. 1997) (en bane) (holding that in the pres­
ence of a mother's objections, a father could not unilaterally convey his own surname to his 
child); see also Huffman v. Fisher, 987 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Ark. 1999) (detailing a "best inter­
est" standard for surname imposition when parents disagree). 
53. Georgia, for instance, deviates from the majority of states in refusing to guarantee 
widows and widowers a share of their spouses' estates at death. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, 
Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REV. 21, 47 & n.68 (1994) (discussing 
Georgia's unusual choice). It also clings to intramarital immunity for tort claims. GA. CODE 
ANN. § 19-3-8 (2002). 
54. 38� U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
55. 434 U.S. 374, 383-91 (1978). 
56. 482 U.S. 78, 94-100 (1987). 
57. Indeed, one of the Justices wrote that the Clause provides more than enough power 
to invalidate a Wisconsin denial of marriage to one subset of noncustodial parents: those 
who do not, or cannot, pay child support. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 406 (1978) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
58. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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may not treat married people better than the unmarried.59 Working 
with Griswold v. Connecticut as a precedent, Justice Brennan re­
minded his readers that individuals and not couples are what concern 
the law: 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the 
marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity 
with a mind and a heart of its own, but an association of two individuals 
each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun­
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.(,() 
B.  Longstanding Federal Nonconstitutional Law 
In 1996, Representative Henry Hyde sought to find out what 
Congress had achieved when it approved the Defense of Marriage 
Act,61 the first federal statute to proclaim a definition of marriage. 
Hyde asked the General Accounting Office ("GAO") "to identify 
federal laws in which benefits, rights, and privileges are contingent on 
marital status."62 In response, GAO staffers searched electronic ver­
sions of the United States Code looking for pertinent words and word 
stems, and came up with a count of 1049 federal laws.63 The major ones 
are noted here. 
1. Tax 
Federal tax policy recognizes marriage in numerous respects. For 
example, the joint return, available also for state income taxes, treats 
married couples as one taxpaying unit.64 A marriage "penalty" or "bo­
nus" reflects the consequences of marital filing: some couples pay less 
tax, and others pay more, based on their marital status.65 Federal law 
uses marriage as a way to defer tax obligations when an affluent indi­
vidual dies leaving a widowed spouse, who inherits.66 Gift tax law takes 
59. Eisenstandt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
60. Id. 
61. 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
62. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP. OGC-97-16, at 1 (1997) [hereinafter GAO REPORT 
OGC-97-16). 
63. GAO REPORT OGC-97-16, supra note 62, at 2. 
64. I.RC. § 6013(a) (2003). 
65. I.RC. § 6013(a). 
66. I.RC. § 2056. 
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the marital status of donors and recipients into account when deter­
mining tax liabilities.67 Property transfers between spouses are not 
subject to gain-loss valuation.68 
2. Military and Veterans Law 
Military service and marriage come together in veterans' benefits, 
which "include pensions, indemnity compensation for service­
connected deaths, medical care, nursing home care, right to burial in 
veterans' cemeteries, educational assistance, and housing. "69 Spouses 
of service personnel share in these statutory entitlements.70 The GAO 
has described military spouses' benefits, including employment assis­
tance and commissary privileges, as "unique."71 Spouses of federal ci­
vilian employees can also claim various distributions, such as insurance 
payments and retirement annuities. Disability payments for work re­
lated injuries may increase if a federal employee has a spouse.72 
3. Immigration 
When aliens receive special residency status due to their employ­
ment, their spouses may also receive special status.73 The "fiancee 
visa" recognizes a couple's intention to marry.74 The entitlement to 
share residency privileges with a spouse opens aliens' marriages to 
administrative scrutiny. If the federal government believes that a cou­
ple married only to provide residency privileges to an alien spouse, it 
can declare the marriage a sham and deport the alien.75 
4. Family Medical Leave 
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 199376 has been on the 
books for more than a decade, qualifying as "longstanding" for pur-
67. l.R.C. § 2501. 
68. l.R.C. § 1041. 
69. GAO REPORT OGC-97-16, supra note 62, at 3. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 4. 
72. Id. at 5. 
73. 8 u.s.c. § 1153(d) (2000). 
74. 8 U.S.C. §§ 110l(a)(15)(K)(i), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
75. Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions 
and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 672-73 (1997) (noting the "highly intrusive 
investigation techniques" that are used to determine the validity of an immigrant's mar­
riage). 
76. 29 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). 
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poses of classification in this Part.77 Under this statute, all employers 
with fifty or more employees must extend unpaid leave to workers 
who wish to care for a parent, child, or spouse.78 Unrelated adults in 
need of the employee's care do not trigger the employer's obligation; a 
spouse is the only adult of the employee's generation who qualifies for 
this employer-supported benefit.79 
5. Evidentiary Privileges 
In addition to these statutory recognitions of marriage, federal 
common law, which holds strong in the law of evidence, also recog­
nizes the marital relation.80 In evidence law a husband and wife retain 
some of their coriunon law, coverture-based oneness. Until 1933, a 
married person was deemed incompetent to testify in favor of his 
spouse in federal court.81 This drawback to being married has been 
replaced by evidentiary rules that make being married a source of 
power for witnesses and parties to litigation. Two significant marital 
privileges have endured: the privilege to exclude adverse spousal tes­
timony, and the confidential marital communications privilege. Confi­
dential marital communications are absolutely privileged from disclo­
sure, and either spouse may invoke the privilege.82 
C. Longstanding State-Level Laws 
Defense-of-marriage laws on the books of a majority of states 
underscore an extensive statutory and common law scheme that 
bolsters marriage. Not every state gives equal regard to marriage; 
California, Vermont, and Hawaii, for example, have been leaders in 
blurring the lines between the statuses of married and unmarried.83 
77. Cf infra Part 11.B (noting more recent changes in state and federal law that are at­
tributable to the mid-1990s "marriage movement"). 
78. 29 u.s.c. §§ 2611(2), 2612, 2614. 
79. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(l)(C). See generally Nancy J. King, The Family Medical Leave 
Act: An Ethical Model for Human Resource Policies and Decisions, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 321, 
355 (1999) (criticizing this stance). 
80. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (recognizing common-law evidentiary privileges); see also 
infra Part I.C.6 (examining evidentiary privileges at the state level). 
81. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 380-82 (1933). 
82. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 4, at 395 (citing People v. Vermeulen, 438 
N.W.2d 36 (Mich. 1989) (allowing a defendant charged with murdering his second wife to 
exclude the testimony of his first wife, to whom he had confided his plan to murder the sec­
ond wife)); see United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1, 2-6 (1st Cir. 1998) (ordering confidential 
marital communications suppressed); United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1018 (6th Cir. 
1993) (stating prerequisites to assertion of this privilege). 
83. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. 
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Nevertheless, all recognize marriage as a legal category with money 
and privileges at stake. 
1. Inheritance and Post-Death Benefits 
When a married person dies holding assets, his or her spouse will 
almost certainly inherit at least a portion of those assets, unless the 
surviving spouse waived claims to them in an antenuptial contract - a 
bargain that by hypothesis gave the now-widowed spouse something in 
exchange.84 Many states forbid the disinheriting of spouses, and all of 
them establish wives and husbands as default beneficiaries when dece­
dents die without a will, a common scenario.85 Most state laws favor 
spouses over the decedent's siblings when the decedent has made no 
will and has no children; the Uniform Probate Code provides that 
spouses typically inherit a large portion of the estate, even when the 
intestate decedent had children.86 Married decedents who die intestate 
may not have intended to leave money to their wives or husbands, but 
the state in effect chooses to write a will benefiting these widowed 
spouses. 
In addition to collecting money by inheritance, a surviving spouse 
will typically enjoy a preference to be appointed the personal repre­
sentative when the spouse dies intestate.87 This widow or widower can 
also claim worker's compensation survivor benefits.88 It is he or she 
whom the law usually empowers to decide how to dispose of the dece­
dent's remains, whether to make anatomical gifts from the decedent's 
body,89 and whether to bring a wrongful death or survival action.90 
84. "Consideration" stands for the notion that all parties to a valid contract give up 
something and gain something when the contract is formed. To be sure, consideration is 
frequently absent, or misperceived, in intramarital contracts. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, 
Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65, 79-80 (1998) (noting 
incoherent judicial treatment of the consideration requirement for marital contracts). Never­
theless, courts typically scrutinize prenuptial agreements for fairness more than contracts 
between unrelated adults. Id. at 74-77. 
85. See Waggoner, supra note 53, passim. 
86. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(1) (1998); see also Waggoner, supra note 53, at 27. 
87. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-305(c). Most states also follow a presumption of spousal 
guardianship when a married person becomes mentally incapacitated, and ignore unmarried 
partners for this purpose. See David L. Chambers, What If! The Legal Consequences of Mar­
riage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 456-57 
(1996). 
88. Albina Engine & Mach. Works v. O'Leary, 328 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1964) (using 
state law to determine whether a claimant was a "surviving wife" for purposes of obtaining 
federal workers' compensation benefits). 
89. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3(a) (1987). 
90. See Nancy J. Knauer, The September 11 Attacks and Surviving Same-Sex Partners: 
Defining Family Through Tragedy, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 31 ,  40-41 (2002) (noting that "standing 
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2. Community Property 
Although only nine states follow the Spanish-derived marital prop­
erty regime that sees spouses as holding "a present, undivided, one­
half interest in all property acquired by the efforts of either spouse 
during the marriage,''91 these states include California and Texas, first 
and third in population, respectively. The minority regime of commu­
nity property therefore covers twenty-eight percent of Americans.92 
Community property understands marriage as a property-holding unit 
that overrides the individual predilections and desires of a spouse. Al­
though it excludes some separate property from the marital commu­
nity, community-property regimes impose a strong legal oneness on 
the holdings of married individuals. 
3. Deferred Community Property 
In the majority of states that follow the common law approach to 
marital property, and thus do not locate a property-holding commu­
nity within marriage, community-property influences will manifest 
themselves upon divorce as well as upon death. For purposes of asset 
division in divorce, many states presume that " [a]ll property acquired 
by either spouse after the marriage and before a decree of legal sepa­
ration is presumed to be marital property."93 This rule implicitly ac­
cepts the community-property proviso that excludes gifts, inheritances, 
and other acquisitions unrelated to the title-holding spouse's efforts. 
Many states go further, rejecting the proviso and permitting courts to 
divide any assets that either spouse holds - even assets that would 
have been separate property in a community-property regime.94 Such 
property-division rules, like community property, place tremendous 
emphasis on the fact of a marriage, recognizing no other type of union 
as a source of so much compelled sharing between two individuals. 
to sue for wrongful death" is part of the "decision-making authority typically reserved for 
spouses"). 
91 .  WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 4, at 255 n.8. 
92. The nine community property states, Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin, had 80,692,128 people in 2000, when the 
nation's population stood at about 281,000,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000, at 
tbl.2 (2000) available at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab02.pdf (Dec. 28, 2000). 
93. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 (1970). 
94. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Redefin­
ing Families, Reforming Custody Jurisdiction, and Refining Support Issues, 34 FAM. L.Q. 607, 
657 (2001) (noting twenty-one jurisdictions). 
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4. Consortium 
In most of the United States, anyone who injures a married person 
is deemed also to have injured the spouse of that individual, and state 
laws allow the spouse to sue the tortfeasor for harm to the marital re­
lationship.95 Many states extend this entitlement to parents or children 
of the injured person, but case law around the country typically rejects 
the consortium claims of same-sex partners, plaintiffs who were 
merely engaged to the injured person, and other litigants who fall 
short of being married.96 Tort law further underscores the importance 
of marriage by regarding the spouse's claim as derivative; this stance 
generally forces the spouse to sue in the same action as the direct vic­
tim and attributes weaknesses in the direct victim's claim (such as 
flaws in the prima facie case, or contributory negligence) to the 
spouse.97 
5.  Tenancy by the Entirety 
Many states recognize a unique form of shared ownership that only , 
a married couple can enjoy. Tenants by the entirety hold property per 1 
tout et non per my, in the Norman phrase - "by the whole and not by 
the share."98 This form of concurrent ownership resembles a joint ten­
ancy, except that it adds a fifth unity, the unity of marriage, to the four 
unities needed to create joint tenancy: unity of time, title, interest, and 
possession.99 One writer calls tenancy by the entirety "a particularly 
difficult form of doublethink: to think about two persons as though 
they were one."100 Many state courts have interpreted the creation of 
separate legal personhood in the Married Women's Property Acts to 
require the abolition of tenancy by the entirety.101 In the states that 
95. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 842-43 (2000). 
96. See, e.g., Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group, 3 P.3d 916, 922-23 (Alaska 2000) 
(denying consortium to a plaintiff who was merely engaged, not married, to the direct vic­
tim); Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095, 1096 (Mass. 1987) (denying loss-of­
consortium claim to a plaintiff who had co-habited with the victim for more than twenty 
years before the injury); cf Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 877-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) 
(holding that a same-sex partner could not recover as a bystander for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress). 
97. DOBBS, supra note 95. 
98. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 323 (4th ed. 1998) (translating 
"my" as "moieties" rather than "share"). 
99. Id. at 322-23. 
100. John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law 
Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 40. 
101 .  Steve R. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc: Tenancy-by-the-Entireties 
Interests and the Federal Tax Lien, 60 Mo. L. REV. 839, 843 (1995). 
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have kept it, however, a crucial practical distinction emerges between 
tenancy by the entirety and joint tenancy: whereas property held in 
joint tenancy is accessible to one spouse's creditors, property held in 
tenancy by the entirety often cannot be reached.102 This version of 
concurrent ownership gives married individuals a place to keep their 
property safe from third-party seizure. If not for marriage, they would 
have no such refuge. 
6. Evidentiary Privileges 
In thirteen states, a person can stop his or her spouse from testify­
ing adversely.1 03 The broader confidential-communications privilege 
covers disclosure between husbands and wives in the confidence of the 
marital relationship.104 Both the adverse-testimony and the confiden­
tial-communications privileges rest on an ancient marital unity, the 
destruction of which would "destroy the best solace of human exis­
tence," according to venerable Supreme Court decisional law.105 
II. How THE "CASE FOR MARRIAGE" HAS AFFECTED MARRIAGE 
AS A LEGAL CATEGORY 
While the law of marriage described in the last Part rests rather 
ponderously on an old "tradition," marriage-related doctrine has 
moved down newer paths. Marriage laws formed in the past assigned 
privileges, and a few detriments, to married individuals unselfcon­
sciously, without stating much of an agenda. Newer laws promote mar­
riage as a measure of social engineering.106 This shift toward overt at­
tempts to improve individuals' lives and social welfare invites critical 
attention: proposals, arguments, new legislation, and social science are 
available for scrutiny. 
102. These states are Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming, plus the District of 
Columbia. See Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294-95 (Haw. 1977) (surveying national law). 
103. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 2045, 2047-48 (1995). 
104. LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 144 (2d ed. 2000). One 
commentator reports that the confidential-communications privilege "is recognized by the 
District of Columbia and all fifty states, except possibly Connecticut." Pamela A. Haun, The 
Marital Privilege in the Twenty-First Century, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 137, 159 (2001). 
105. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223 (1839). 
106. Katherine Shaw Spaht takes a differing view, arguing that over the last century the 
law has withdrawn from marriage, and so the contemporary marriage movement amounts to 
a "counter-revolution." Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The 
Future of Marriage in the Law, 49 LOY. L. REV. 1 ,  6, 28 (2003). Professor Spaht dedicates her 
article "to the courageous and intellectually honest individuals throughout this country who 
are members of the nascent Marriage Movement." Id. at 1 .  
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A. The "Case for Marriage" Emerges from the Marriage Movement 
As an umbrella term, "the marriage movement" covers a variety of 
organizations with overlapping memberships and common agendas.107 
The movement has extensive ties to religious organizations and politi­
cal conservatives, groups that have held influence in the American po­
litical arena for decades. These sectors galvanized the Republican vote 
that helped install Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan into the presi­
dency in past decades. Such successes gave social conservatives robust 
political power, but until the mid-1990s these activists could point to 
few legislative successes. 
Enter neutral, universalist social science as a base to support law 
reform. When buttressed by data, family-values activism gained credi­
bility in policymaking.108 Other stances and arguments can make only a 
partial case for marriage. Your spiritual orientation, or my geographic 
community, might applaud our being married, but when making policy 
arguments these subgroups cannot speak for an entire nation. Moreo­
ver, to the extent such teachings amount only to religious dogma, the 
government may not establish them as policy. Only if marriage is good 
for us as a society, independent of sectarian faith, should the state 
promote it.109 Numbers, not just traditionalist teachings, must support 
the conclusion that being married rather than unmarried conduces to 
the welfare of Americans.110 
107. Although the movement casts itself as diverse, my own premise is that it unites 
around family-values conservatism. For support, see Judith Stacey, Family Values Forever, 
NATION, July 9, 2001, at 26. The arguments I make in this section do not require a reader to 
accept either view. 
The movement made an early appearance with Marriage in America: A Report to the 
Nation, published in 1995, which focused on marriage as a source of benefit to children. See 
The Council on Families in America, Marriage in America: A Report to the Nation, in 
PROMISES TO KEEP, supra note 3, at 293-318. In 1997, sociologists David Popenoe and 
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead formed the National Marriage Project at Rutgers University, a 
source of research about marriage and family life. This group issues an annual report called 
The State of Our Unions. These activists brought their work to the National Institute of 
Health, which in 1998 sponsored an inaugural pro-marriage conference. 
108. See generally Stacey, supra note 107. For a sympathetic exploration of the links 
between social conservatives and the marriage movement, see W. BRADFORD WILCOX, 
SACRED Vows, PuBLIC PURPOSES: RELIGION, THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, AND 
MARRIAGE POLICY (2002), available at http://pewforum.org/publications/reports/marriage­
policy.pdf (May 2002). 
109. See Jonathan Rauch, For Better or Worse?, NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 1996, at 19 ("If 
we want to know what and whom marriage is for in modern America, we need a sensible 
secular doctrine."). 
110. Brian Bix makes a related plea for clarity on what exactly state recognition of mar­
riage achieves. See Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States' Interest in the Marital Status 
of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 ,  7 (2000) (claiming that the state interest in mar­
riage goes beyond "the Utilitarian justification that a state prefers having its citizens' prefer­
ences satisfied"). 
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In 2000, sociologist Linda Waite and a journalist co-author, Maggie 
Gallagher, presented a leading manifesto for the movement.111 Com­
pact and cards-on-the-table explicit, The Case for Marriage: Why Mar­
ried People Are Happier, Healthier, and Better Off Financially will 
stand in for the larger body of case-for-marriage literature in this Arti­
cle.112 The Case for Marriage, lining up married Americans on one side 
opposite unmarried Americans on the other, deems the former cate­
gory significantly advantaged. Joined by other writers, Waite and 
Gallagher demonstrate that married persons enjoy longer life and bet­
ter health than the unmarried.113 Married persons also possess more 
wealth,114 have sex more often and with more satisfaction,115 report 
more happiness,116 and rear better-adjusted children. Although it does 
not deny that many individuals suffer detriment in their marriages and 
would be better off single, the "case" finds no aggregate drawbacks to 
marriage. As many see the data, there is no significant demographic 
variable where singles as a group enjoy more well-being than married 
persons.117 
111. LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY 
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BEITER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000). 
1 12. See also DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER (1996) (arguing that children 
benefit from marriage); MARRIAGE, HEALTH, AND THE PROFESSIONS (John Wall et al. eds., 
2002) (arguing that the benefits of marriage suggest implications for various professions); 
James Q. Wilson, The Decline of Marriage, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 17, 2002, at Gl 
(advocating that the state shore up marriage). Other works make the argument in passing. 
See, e.g. , WILLIAM A GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES 284-85 (1991) (identifying a state 
interest in marriage based on the superiority of the two-parent household); Chambers, supra 
note 87, at 490 (declaring that governments "seem justified in favoring a special relationship 
with someone known as a spouse over other relationships of friendship or kinship"). 
113.  WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111 ,  at 47-64; John Wall & Don S. Browning, 
Introduction to MARRIAGE, HEAL TH, AND THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 1 12. 
1 14. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111 ,  at 97-123. 
1 15. Linda J. Waite & Kara Joyner, Emotional Satisfaction and Physical Pleasure in 
Sexual Unions: Time Horizon, Sexual Behavior, and Sexual Exclusivity, 63 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 247, 253-63 (2001). 
1 16. Ed Diener & Martin E.P. Seligman, Very Happy People, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 81, 84 
(2002). 
Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman has cast doubt on the reliability of self-reports of hap­
piness, however. In an extensive study he found that divorced women deemed their lives less 
satisfying than did married women. Nevertheless, they were more cheerful than married 
women over the course of a day. Erica Goode, A Conversation with Daniel Kahneman: On 
Profit, Loss and the Mystery of the Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at Fl. Journalist Laura 
Miller interprets this finding as divorced women's complying with a social imperative to see 
themselves as miserable, even though they are in fact happier than married women. Laura 
Miller, State of the Single Woman, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Dec. 28, 2002, at Ml9, available 
at http://archive.salon.com/books/feature/2002/12/12/single/index_np.html (Dec. 12, 2002). 
1 17. But see Elizabeth Cooksey, Consequences of Young Mothers' Marital Histories for 
Children's Cognitive Development, 59 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 245, 245-61 (1997) (suggesting 
that among low-income African Americans, children from single-parent homes do better in 
school than counterparts from two-parent homes); Stephanie Coontz & Nancy Folbre, Mar­
riage, Poverty, and Public Policy: A Discussion Paper from the Council on Contemporary 
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Clear policy implications emerge, advocates say. At a mm1mum, 
the United States needs more marriages - simply because every mar­
riage, ceteris paribus, flips two persons from the disadvantaged into 
the advantaged category, augmenting national welfare - and it also 
should encourage individuals to choose marriage over singleness.U8 
More is needed, some marriage advocates say. They divide on thorny 
issues like divorce restrictions and protecting traditional opposite-sex 
marriage from same-sex initiatives. In reviewing the "case for mar­
riage," however, I restrict myself to its consensus, the core rather than 
peripheries: marriage is good; more marriage would be better. 
B .  Law Reforms Following the "Case" 
1. Covenant Marriage 
Marriage partisans have worked to create a more solemn, alterna­
tive form of state-sponsored marriage in order to remedy an excess 
they perceive in the divorce rate: couples, they say, tend to flee their 
marriages too quickly.119 In this view, the liberalized grounds for di­
vorce that began with California's no-fault reform left Americans 
worse off. Codified now in three states and under consideration else­
where, covenant marriage allows couples to reject no-fault or easy di­
vorce for themselves by signing a declaration of intent when they 
marry. Their declaration affirms the importance of marriage, and per­
sons who choose covenant marriage accept premarital counseling and 
agree to forgo some of the easier avenues to dissolution. In Louisiana, 
where this innovation takes its strongest form, a covenant marriage 
can be dissolved only for adultery, conviction of a felony with subse­
quent imprisonment, desertion for at least one year, physical abuse of 
a spouse or child, or a two-year separation.12° The Arkansas version is 
similar. Watering covenant marriage down to very little at the time 
Families' Fifth Annual Conference (Apr. 26-28, 2002), at http://www.contemporary­
families.org/public/briefing.html (offering data on how disruptive it is to get a stepparent in a 
child's life and describing how, among unstable couples, a first violent episode often occurs 
soon after a formal commitment). One trivial negative effect of being married, according to 
the "case," is that married men and women are more likely to be overweight and not to ex­
ercise (even though they are healthier). Linda J. Waite, The Health Benefits of Marriage, in 
MARRIAGE, HEALTH, AND THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 1 12, at 17. 
118. See, e.g. , COALITION FOR MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND COUPLES EDUCATION ET AL., 
THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (2000), available at 
http://www.marriagemovement.org/html/MMStatement.html (Whether an individual ever 
personally marries or not, a healthy marriage culture benefits every citizen in the United 
States . . . .  ") . 
1 19. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and 
Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 66-70 (1998) (discussing, inter alia, the work of 
Maggie Gallagher, David Popenoe, and Barbara Dafoe Whitehead). 
120. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272, 9:307 (2001) (enacted 1997). 
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of dissolution, Arizona permits these marriages to end by mutual 
consent.121 
Critics like to dismiss covenant marriage as trivial, often citing the 
tiny percentage of marrying couples who choose 'premium' instead of 
'regular' when given a choice,122 but the endeavor extends beyond a 
handful of couples in Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas. Most state 
legislatures that have rejected covenant-marriage bills have accepted 
lesser measures with the same purpose of shoring up marriage. One 
favored statutory provision encourages marital counseling, not only at 
the divorce decision point but also as part of premarital education.123 
2. Slowing Divorce 
Going beyond covenant marriage, the marriage movement has 
pursued other law reforms to make divorces proceed more slowly. Re­
peals of no-fault divorce have not yet made it into the states' law 
books, but legislators continually propose, for instance, to amend no­
fault divorce by requiring mutual consent (an approach that has pre­
vailed in New York all along, but amounts to a conservative change in 
many other states) or to lengthen waiting periods in no-fault divorces 
involving children.124 Process-oriented reforms have been easier to en­
act. Several states have in recent years modified their court-ordered 
divorce mediation programs to introduce marriage-friendly mediation, 
which encourages couples to reconcile. Traditional mediation, by con­
trast, strives only for an amicable dissolution.125 
3. Transfer Payments 
Governments channel funds toward marriage-booster programs. 
Several state-level initiatives purport to sweeten the deal for those 
who marry or stay married, offering payments that reward getting 
married with cash.126 When President George W. Bush announced in 
121. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (2000). 
122. See Stark, supra note 7, at 1487 n.29 (noting low participation rate). I borrow the 
premium-or-regular phrase from a former student, Chandra Jones, who came up with it here 
in gas-guzzling Atlanta. 
123. Marilyn Weber Serafini, Get Hitched, Stay Hitched, 34 NAT'Ll. 694, 696 (2002). 
124. William A Galston, Divorce American Style, PUB. INT., Summer 1996, at 12, 21-24. 
125. For the traditional view, see Judith M. Wolf, Sex, Lies, and Divorce Mediation, 
ARIZ. ATT'Y, Nov. 1996, at 25, 34, who notes that "[m]ediation is not designed to bring the 
marriage back together." But see Alison E. Gerencser, Family Mediation: Screening for Do­
mestic Abuse, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 43, 49 n.37 (1995) (noting that California pioneered 
"court-connected conciliation services" aimed at reconciliation in 1939). 
126. Mark O'Keefe, Marriage-Is-Better Movement Expands, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, 
July 27, 2001, at A3 (describing costly efforts in several states); see also WILCOX, supra note 
108 (describing an elaborate $10 million effort in Oklahoma promoted by marriage-
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February 2002 that he intended to appropriate $300 million for mar­
riage initiatives,127 a few states already had such programs underway. 
In West Virginia, for instance, welfare recipients who marry receive an 
extra hundred dollars per month.128 Florida and Minnesota reduce 
marriage license fees for couples who prove they have taken a mar­
riage preparation course.129 
The Bush proposal was not the first federal marriage-promoting 
declaration in recent memory to announce marriage-related effects on 
transfer-payment entitlements. Welfare reform legislation in 1996 her­
alded marriage as "the foundation of a successful society."130 When it 
inaugurated the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program, a 
substitute for traditional federal aid to dependent persons, Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Congress announced its 
desire to "encourage the formation and maintenance of 2-parent fami­
lies. "131 Wade Horn, founder of the Fatherhood Initiative,132 had spent 
years proposing federal expenditures on the cause before he was 
named Assistant Secretary for Family Support in the Bush Depart­
ment of Health and Human Services.133 
The Bush administration named its family and welfare legislative 
program "Working Toward Independence," linking marriage to free­
dom from dependency on government transfer payments.134 Instead of 
addressing needy families as the pre-1996 federal welfare program had 
provided, "Working Toward Independence" would finance state-level 
initiatives to foster marriage, and state governments would work with 
"faith-based organizations."135 In the 107th Congress, the House of 
Representatives passed draft legislation, endorsing "healthy, married, 
enthusiast Governor Frank Keating). For a summary of state marriage-promotion efforts, 
some of which use financial inducements, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
STATE POLICIES TO PROMOTE MARRIAGE: PRELIMINARY REPORT (2002). 
127. Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Bush Urges Work and Marriage Programs in Welfare 
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A18. 
128. O'Keefe, supra note 126. 
129. See Mary Ellen Klas, Gov. Bush Hatching Families Initiative, PALM BEACH POST, 
Dec. 18, 2002, at lA (describing government programs); O'Keefe, supra note 126. 
130. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, § 101, 1 10 Stat. 2105, 2110, 211 1  (1996). 
131 .  42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2000). 
132. For more information, see http:l/www.fatherhood.org/. 
133. Katha Pollitt, Forward to the Past, NATION, July 9, 2001, at 10, 10. 
134. Press Release, The White House, President Names Senior Advisor for Welfare 
Policy, at http://www. hitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-reform-announcement­
book-all.html (Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter President Names Senior Advisor]. 
135. Id. 
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2-parent families," allocating $120 million for state programs to pro­
mote marriage.136 
4. DOMA and "Baby DOMAs" 
How much credit the marriage movement can take for the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA")137 and the state counterpart ver­
sions, or "baby DOMAs" now on the books in approximately thirty­
seven states, is uncertainY8 Many consider the federal DOMA, signed 
into law on September 21,  1 996, to be a reaction to Baehr v. Lewin, a 
1993 case that suggested the state constitution of Hawaii might require 
the recognition of same-sex marriage.139 Commentators also link the 
federal DOMA with Romer v. Evans,140 which struck down an anti­
gay-rights initiative as unconstitutional and may have thereby encour­
aged gay-rights activists to pursue this prize.141 It is likely that mar­
riage-policy activism and the DOMA phenomenon are not each 
other's cause or effect, but rather separate facets of a renascent tradi­
tionalism. 
Defense-of-marriage efforts and the marriage movement came to­
gether in a federal marriage amendment, introduced in the House of 
Representatives in May 2002.142 This proposed amendment to the 
Constitution would prohibit same-sex marriages. In interviews with 
journalists, sponsors of this legislation spoke in the utilitarian, social­
engineering rhetoric characteristic of the marriage movement: es­
chewing religious references, they invoked "social policy" and a need 
136. H.R. 4737, 107th Cong. (2002). 
137. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
138. The count is unsteady because states continue to consider both enactment 
and repeal of these defense-of-marriage acts. The number thirty-seven was accurate as of 
March 2003. 
139. 852 P.2d 44, 59-60 (Haw. 1993) (calling Hawaiian equal protection law more 
"elaborate" in its grants than the Fourteenth Amendment), superseded by HAW. CONST. art. 
1 ,  § 23 ("The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples."). 
140. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
141. See Mark Strasser, Some Observations About DOMA, Marriages, Civil Unions, and 
Domestic Partnerships, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 363, 365 (2002) (suggesting Romer "has impor­
tant implications for the constitutionality of DOMA"); Veronica C. Abreu, Note, The Malle­
able Use of History in Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence: How the "Deeply Rooted" Test 
Should Not Be a Barrier to Finding the Defense of Marriage Act Unconstitutional Under the 
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 44 B.C. L. REV. 177 (2002) (calling DOMA a reac­
tion to Baehr and Romer). 
142. H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002). 
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to maintain "the union of two genders," which "has unique and irre­
placeable benefits for kids and society."143 
C. The "Case" in a Skeptical Light: Toward Revision 
The "case for marriage" draws a picture of goods and gains, and its 
influence continues to change the law. A critical look at it, however, 
casts these achievements in doubt. Marriage may not deserve the 
credit for the welfare effects that often accompany being married. 
Even if marriage did deserve this credit, these gains cannot support 
retaining, as compared with abolishing, state-sponsored marriage. 
1. Correlation and Causation 
That married people are better off than unmarried people does not 
demonstrate that marriage makes people better off. As critics of the 
marriage movement have long charged, correlation is not causation. A 
selection effect may be at work: perhaps individuals destined for 
health and wealth want to get married before they achieve success, 
have little trouble finding suitable partners, and smoothly stay married 
throughout their lives.144 Individuals predisposed to illness and 
poverty, by contrast, may have trouble forming stable and harmonious 
relationships. It might be truer to say that such unfortunates are 
not married because they are unhealthy, rather than that they are 
unhealthy because they are not married.145 
Marriage partisans have worked diligently to refute this criticism. 
Waite and Gallagher, for example, report that studies of sick persons 
find that those who get married live longer than those who do not.146 
Longitudinal studies, looking at the same cohort of people over time, 
find happiness during the married years of their subjects' lives and 
unhappiness during the divorced years.147 The Case for Marriage also 
identifies particular marital behaviors, like wifely nagging, that it finds 
143. Stephanie Francis Cahill, Between a Man and a Woman: Federal Marriage Amend­
ment Would Ban Same-Sex Marriages, ABA J. E-REP., May 24, 2002, at WL 1 No. 20 
ABAJEREP 5. 
144. See Shankar Vedantam, Does a Ring Bring Happiness, or Vice Versa?, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 21, 2003, at A9 (reporting a fifteen-year study of more than 24,000 persons in 
Germany that identified a "set point" of happiness at which individuals tend to rest regard­
less of their marital status, suggesting that marrying does not of itself make people happier). 
145. Cf JESSIE BERNARD, THE FuTURE OF MARRIAGE 17 (1982) (quoting Samuel 
Johnson as declaring marriage to be "the best state for man in general; and every man is a 
worse man in proportion as he is unfit for the married state"). 
146. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 51-52. 
147. Id. at 59-71. But see Goode, supra note 116, at Fl (casting doubt on self-reports of 
happiness). 
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salubrious.148 But such evidence does not refute the selection effect; if 
credited, it demonstrates only that getting married can convey a few 
particular benefits. 
Meanwhile, other effects cloud the picture, notably the correlation 
between marriage and wealth.149 The prosperous marry at a high rate, 
and tend to stay married; the poor are less likely to marry and more 
likely to divorce. Low-income women look for economic stability in a 
partner before marrying him,150 and for their part, men, Cinderella­
rescue myths notwithstanding, apparently prefer wives who earn good 
wages.151 Health and wealth are not independent variables: persons 
with money also have good health insurance, access to wholesome 
hospitals, shelter from street criminals and dangerous buildings, safe 
distances from environmental pollution, and the prerogative to decline 
jobs that would sicken or maim them. The odds are that such persons 
have spouses too. If marriage can get credit for the welfare that pros­
perous people enjoy, then high-quality clothes and large houses de­
serve credit too.152 
2. Reasoning from a Base of Favoritism 
Individuals are well-advised to follow a favored path rather than a 
disfavored one, to the extent that they have a choice. The Case for 
Marriage has duly commended marriage as something to get if you can 
get it. "Buy them a copy of this book," urge Waite and Gallagher to 
readers who have relatives or friends in a state of faltering faith, "and 
highlight the parts on sex, health, wealth, or children, depending on 
the situation."153 Notwithstanding this recommendation to strangers 
about the way they should live, The Case for Marriage provokes more 
questions than it answers. 
" [S]ex, health, wealth, children": the law chooses to interfere in all 
of these realms to shift advantages to married persons. We can note 
the four realms briefly in turn. When it criminalizes fornication and 
148. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111 ,  at 55. 
149. See Coontz & Folbre, supra note 1 17. 
150. Kathryn Edin, Few Good Men: Why Poor Mothers Don't Marry or Remarry, AM. 
PROSPECT, Jan. 3, 2000, at 28. 
151 .  Sharon Sassier & Robert Schoen, The Effect of Attitudes and Economic Activity on 
Marriage, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 147, 148-49 (1999). 
152. Ironically, Waite and Gallagher attack marriage critic Jessie Bernard for ignoring 
the wealth effect. Bernard found single women less depressed than married women; Waite 
and Gallagher retort that single women are economic elites. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra 
note 111 ,  at 165. Putting aside the question of whether single women really are economic 
elites, the same reasoning would undermine many of their own assertions. 
153. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111 ,  at 191 .  
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adultery - as it still does in many places154 - the state expresses dis­
approval of extramarital sex, a message that might correlatively vali­
date the experience of sex within marriage. Prison wardens typically 
withhold conjugal visits from unmarried inmates.155 Residential land­
lords around the United States are free in most locales to indulge a 
prejudice against renting to unmarried couples.156 Little wonder that 
the married, subsidized by positive law, are at a sexual advantage. 
Next, health. Extending employment-based medical insurance to 
the spouses of workers, an allocation strategy that the law encourages 
and fosters,157 spreads health through marriage: whereas only a little 
over half of single women have private health insurance, eighty-three 
percent of married women have it.158 Every married person has a next­
of-kin partner situated to intervene benevolently with the institutional 
medical care that he or she will receive; the law extends this privilege 
to spouses, but not to other persons, such as friends.159 
Wealth-related legal interventions in favor of marriage are espe­
cially numerous. As I have mentioned and will detail, the joint income 
tax return, gift and estate tax exemptions, transfer payments like 
Social Security, standing to collect wrongful death and survivor and 
consortium damages in tort litigation, access to health and life insur­
ance, protections in bankruptcy law, and numerous other privileges 
categorically deliver wealth to married persons. The "children" item 
154. See Oliverson v. W. Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1474-75 (D. Utah 1995) 
("[M]ost states have continued to maintain adultery statutes as a part of their criminal 
law."); C. Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters But Should Marriage?: Adultery, Fraternization, 
and Honor in the Military, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 177, 178 (1999) (noting that the contem­
porary U.S. military prosecutes adultery vigorously); Elaine Monaghan, Georgia Annuls 
Ancient Law on Sex, TIMES (London), Jan. 16, 2003, at 17 (counting ten jurisdictions in the 
United States that still criminalize fornication). Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 
which held that states could not criminalize sodomy, might be interpreted to invalidate the 
crime of fornication, but this development has not yet taken hold. 
155. Conjugal visits are scarce even for the married. James Doran, Voice of Experience 
for the Executive Facing Jail, TIMES (London), Dec. 7, 2002, at 58 (quoting veteran inmate 
who recommends that about-to-be-sentenced American white-collar criminals abandon their 
hopes of conjugal visits during their incarceration). 
156. David Kushner, Free Exercise, Fair Housing and Marital Status - Alaskan Style, 12 
ALASKA L. REV. 335, 348-56 (1995) (surveying state laws). See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 
123 S. Ct. 2472, 2496 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]n most States what the Court calls 
'discrimination' against those who engage in homosexual acts is perfectly legal."). 
157. See infra Part IIl.B.1 .  
158. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111 ,  at 60. A freelance journalist recounted her 
decision to abandon her ideological stance against marriage in order to obtain health insur­
ance. Sheelah Kolhatkar, In Sickness and Health (Care): Marrying To Get a 'Blue Card,' 
FORWARD, May 23, 2003, at 1 ("Several days ago I developed a dreadful cough and started 
feeling feverish. Fearing pneumonia, I rushed home to my boyfriend and said, 'Let's get 
married!' "). 
159. Cf Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 883-84 (Vt. 1999); Chambers, supra note 87, at 
454-55. 
162 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:129 
does not directly relate to the others on the list. Your relative or friend 
who has doubts about marriage probably wants more sex, health, and 
wealth, rather than less, but more children? Or is it fewer? In any 
event, the law extends benefits to married parents that are unavailable 
to unmarried ones.1ro If marriage leaves us better off with respect to 
sex, health, wealth, and children, then, we have laws - which can 
be change.ct to take away privileged treatment - to thank for at 
least some of this largesse. One might speak of the "case for being 
privileged." 
If the state were to get out of the marriage business, nobody would 
be favored because nobody would be married in the official, blessed­
by-the-state sense that the marriage movement uses the term. To the 
extent that the benefits of marriage come from something other than 
positive law, marriage-like living arrangements unsanctioned by the 
state would continue to leave people better off.161 More intimacy of 
any kind might be what does the trick.162 
Partisans suggest that marriage is unique, however, because by 
raising the costs of exit it fosters the boons of specialization and 
comparative advantage. You go conquer the market; I'll hone my 
childrearing skills; in the end, together we'll have good money and 
good kids, profiting more as a married couple than we would if we 
160. Fathers are especially affected by this stance, as a look at Supreme Court prece­
dents confirms. For example, a man who begets a child out of wedlock and is not declared its 
father in a formal filiation proceeding cannot be certain that his child will be able to inherit 
from him if he dies intestate. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 264 (1978) (upholding a denial 
of inheritance rights even though the decedent had acknowledged paternity in a notarized 
document). In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250 (1983), the Court held that a biological 
father was not entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before his child was adopted 
if he had not assumed any responsibility for the child's care. Lehr left open the question of 
whether a mother could nullify all of the father's due process rights by cutting off his contact 
with the child. See id. at 269-70 (White, J., dissenting); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110, 1 19-30 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that a man who fathered a child out of 
wedlock, to whom he reportedly felt a deep connection, could not be declared the child's 
father, because the California statute that irrebutably identified a mother's husband as the 
father was constitutional). 
161 .  Benefits to cohabitants provide an illustration. One advantage to being married in 
the United States is access to intergenerational wealth transfers: parents of adult children 
appear more forthcoming with gifts when their children have families of their own. WAITE & 
GALLAGHER, supra note 1 1 1, at 117-18. Should legal marriage be abolished, perhaps these 
generous parental impulses would continue and the paired-off, family-starting adult child 
would continue to reap this benefit. 
162. Interview by Patrick Perry with Dean Omish, founder, Preventative Medicine Re­
search Institute, in Patrick Perry, Matters of the Heart, SAT. EVENING POST, Sept.-Oct. 1998, 
at 38 (describing a Harvard study that correlated feeling close to one's parents in youth with 
better health in midlife); see also Steven Stack, Marriage, Family and Loneliness: A Cross­
National Study, 41 Soc. PERSP. 415, 418 (1998) (finding that married people are less lonely 
than single people, but noting that their being partnered, rather than married, might be the 
crucial variable); id. at 416 (decrying the tendency to use college students in studies because 
the "single and childless" state of students occludes the role of marriage and intimate com­
panionship in generating psychological conditions). 
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were each trying individually to have it all.163 Such an arrangement gets 
stronger if the commitment is harder to abandon, but it may not inher­
ently need a license from the state. The experiment of abolishing mar­
riage would demonstrate which gains in health and wealth derive from 
the legal category of marriage - a creation of the legislature - and 
which from a long-term dyadic commitment, rooted in contract. At the 
moment the two types of marital gains - those that derive from legal 
favoritism, and those that derive from the relationship itself - get 
tangled together.164 Policymakers must acknowledge that legal favorit­
ism is an artifice, a construct that new artifices can supersede. 
3. Happiness as Policy 
Partisans invoke happiness as a reason to adopt legislative changes 
in support of marriage. Jeremy Bentham did indeed speak of happi­
ness as the goal of legislation,165 but few of his successors have hewed 
to a consistent use of this term or its synonyms as a guide to policy.166 
They will sometimes root legislative choices in the satisfaction of indi­
vidual preferences, and on other occasions ignore or even obstruct 
these desires.167 As legal scholars - a group broad enough to include 
scholars ranging from historians to game theorists - have demon­
strated, the law will proscribe various behaviors that give individuals 
pleasure or satisfaction: hate crimes, polluting of air and water, preda­
tory pricing, and aggressive panhandling, among many others.168 It is a 
truism of the criminal law that antisocial behaviors cause more unhap­
piness than happiness, but legislative prohibitions remain valid even 
when they inflict more misery than they prevent or remedy.169 Happi-
163. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111 ,  at 25-27. I return briefly to the specializa­
tion hypothesis below. See infra note 176 and accompanying text. 
164. See Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, What The Case for Marriage Doesn't Want 
You to Know, at http://www.unrnarried.org/case.htrnl. 
165. See BENTHAM, supra note 43, at 34. 
166. See generally David Dolinko, The Perils of Welfare Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
351, 364-84 (2002) (critiquing "well-being," a concept now used to update Bentham's "hap­
piness," as circular and incoherent). 
167. See Bix, supra note 1 10, at 7-8. 
168. I elaborate in Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility, and the Law of Aggression, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 1-18 (2001). 
169. Two examples of such legislation are laws proscribing oral and anal sexual acts, 
struck down only recently as unconstitutional, see Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003), 
and laws restricting the sale of liquor on Sunday, see, e.g. , CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-91(d) 
(2003). For an account of sodomy laws as a source of grief and anxiety, see Jeremy Quittner, 
Awaiting Judgment Day, ADVOCATE, Mar. 4, 2003, at 48, 52. The article quotes activist 
Paula Ettelbrick: sodomy laws "lend support to the stigma and discrimination that lesbians 
and gay men face - and that allows judges to say you are a criminal and you have no rights." 
Id. ; see also Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Pol­
icy, 103 YALE L.J. 2593, 2607 (1994) (noting that Indiana and Wyoming once criminalized 
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ness does not of itself dictate the content of the law, and references to 
happiness do not conclude an analysis of what the law ought to advo­
cate or compel. 
To put the point more concretely, the same social-science-based, 
utilitarian vantage point that urges individuals to marry has other hap­
piness-related advice to give, but partisans withhold these insights 
from their list of recommendations. Dorian Solot and Marshall Miller 
mention two examples: married couples without children claim to be 
happier than married couples with children, and women with college 
educations are more likely to divorce than non-college-educated 
women.170 The "case for marriage" does not tell Americans to forsake 
having children, nor discourage women from attending college. Yet an 
individual motivated to seek happiness by playing the percentages -
someone seeking maximum returns on "sex, health [and] wealth," if 
not children too, as Waite and Gallagher counsel - would wish to 
know which choices correlate with which outcomes.171 No more com­
mitted to "happiness" than are most other utilitarian policymakers, 
these partisans have cherry-picked what they like from the evidence 
and discarded the rest. 
4. Winners and Losers 
Gaps in welfare between married and unmarried persons may not 
necessarily commend marriage; they may signal bigotry and injustice. 
Take for example one of the biggest statistical effects of marriage: 
"The wage premium married men receive is one of the most well­
documented phenomena in social science," write Waite and 
Gallagher.172 Marriage partisans perceive this effect as benign. Married 
men must be more productive and more likely to show up at work so-
aiding or encouraging "masturbation or self-pollution"). Perhaps such prohibitions make 
people happy, especially if one takes seriously the notion of shoring up public morals as a 
source of happiness. The number of people that such laws make unhappy, however, or the 
quantity of unhappiness that they cause, is almost certainly greater, even if the law is only 
occasionally enforced. The principle that legislation retains validity until it is repealed or 
nullified permits an unhappiness-inducing law to remain in place long after persons made 
happy by its passage have died or become indifferent to the law; this delay is another source 
of misfit between legislation and happiness. 
170. Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, Marriage-Only Forces Don't Help Today's Fami­
lies, at http://www.unmarried.org/marriage-project-sojoumer.htrnl. 
171. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111 ,  at 191. 
172. Id. at 99. 
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ber and on time, perhaps spurred by their role as providers.173 A man 
who aspires to succeed in his career is in want of a wife.174 
The same data, however, support darker speculation. Just as labor­
market demographers have found that American men are overpaid at 
work and women are underpaid - in other words, that men's wages 
reveal a premium unexplained by any variable other than gender175 -
they could similarly conclude that employers overpay married men at 
the expense of single men. Perhaps wage setters prefer married men 
because they feel more comfortable with them and harbor unfounded 
prejudices against single men.176 Perhaps wage-earning married men 
take advantage of their wives - Waite and Gallagher describe wives 
as career counselors and support systems for hard-working husbands177 
- and therefore reap an enlarged share of wages, an unjust enrich­
ment at the wives' expense, for which wives are often uncompensated 
at divorce. Perhaps single men find their singleness depressing, not of 
itself but because of societal prejudices against it, and work less 
productively as a consequence. Perhaps not. The point is that 
differences in welfare between unmarried and married people can be 
attributed to malevolent antecedents as easily as to benign ones. Such 
173. Id. at 99-104. Married fathers of young children have particularly good attendance 
records at work. ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST 
IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD JS THE LEAST VALUED 25 (2001) . 
174. "It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good 
fortune must be in want of a wife." JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 1 (Adelphi ed., 
1930) (1813) . 
175. See Anita Bernstein, Engendered by Technologies, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1, 87 (2001) 
(summarizing evidence from the Department of Labor and the Council of Economic Advis­
ers). For more scathing commentary, see Richard Goldstein, The Myth of Progress, 
VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 12, 2003, at 55. Goldstein faults the Bush administration for reducing 
the federal government's ongoing studies of the wage gap and adds that "[i]f it's tempting 
to believe women are doing just fine, perhaps that's because so many guys hold to this 
idea." Id. 
176. One study finds this hypothesis more plausible than the specialization hypothesis to 
explain the wage gap between married and single men - because, as it turns out, married 
and single men spend similar amounts of time on "home production" work. This study also 
finds the favoritism hypothesis more plausible than the hypothesis of "the selection of more 
productive men into marriage." Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Household Specialization 
and the Male Marriage Wage Premium, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 78, 93 (2000). 
Organizational economics identifies a principal-agent problem that causes firms to inflict 
or suffer harms because their agents, especially managerial employees, pursue agendas in 
conflict with those of the enterprise. See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS 
OF GOVERNANCE 172 (1996) (identifying this problem as fundamental to the study of the 
firm). As agents, managers have intervened in workers' choices to marry. See ALICE 
KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUALITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR 
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 47 (2001) (describing a 1914 program 
at Ford Motor Company that awarded significant extra pay to various workers, most of them 
married men, and that categorically excluded single men under age twenty-two). 
177. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111,  at 104-05, 118-20. 
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differences by themselves do not support a wholesale advocacy of 
marriage. 
III. TOWARD MORE HONEST BOOKKEEPING: COUNTING THE 
DETRIMENTS OF STATE-SPONSORED MARRIAGE 
As we have seen, the utilitarian "case" invites onlookers to con­
sider the question of whether society is better off with or without 
state-sponsored marriage. If societal benefits of marriage justify the 
decision to expand and buttress this institution, as partisans contend, 
then comparable societal detriments would justify the decision to re­
treat from marriage and make it weaker. Only a tendentious version of 
bookkeeping chooses to count the good news, such as increased life 
expectancy of married persons, and write off the bad news, a portion 
of which I discuss in this Part. Here my project is not to tally up the 
aggregate costs and benefits of marriage, which defy computation and 
reduce to disputes about values. Instead, this Part widens the ledger, 
adding relevant variables - both monetary and nonmonetary - in 
order to make the utilitarian inquiry more complete.178 
178. Cf Brauer, supra note 42 ("As an economist, I ask that we all consider, even if the 
administration does not, the total bill to be paid."). 
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A TENTATIVE RANKING OF SOCIETAL DETRIMENTS (OR DISUTILITY) 
ASSOCIATED WITH STA TE RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGE 
VERB PHRASE DESCRIPTION EXAMPLES 
. . . revenue- • Joint income tax 
PRIMARY State recognition related disutilities return 
of marriage with respect to • Gift & estate tax 
causes . . .  public welfare. rules 
• Social Security 
payment 
obligations to 
individuals based 
on their marital 
history rather 
than on need 
. . .  detrimental • Health insurance 
SECONDARY State recognition effects in the allotted to spouses 
of marriage context of an of workers 
facilitates . . .  activity that the • Religious institu-
law regulates. tions receiving state 
funds permitted to 
discriminate on the 
basis of marria):!;e 
. . .  detrimental • Race-based 
TERTIARY State recognition effects via norms, inequities 
of marriage customs, or other • Social privileging 
encourages or may extralegal forces. • Adverse effects 
be linked to . . .  on children 
• Women's poverty 
and near-poverty 
denied or obscured 
• women kept at 
home, away from 
the public realm 
A. Primary Detriments 
The United States government subsidizes marriage through trans­
fer payments and other supports that are not means tested. These 
payments constitute a reward that taxpayers as a group bestow on a 
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class of individuals based solely on these persons' being, or having 
been, married. 
My claim that such transfer payments constitute "detriments" 
compels me to declare my premises.179 I would mention six. The first is 
that the need for government spending is ongoing and constant: 
money spent on transfer payments, or forgone by the decision to cre­
ate some exception to tax, must be recouped by other means. Budget 
cuts would eliminate this need for recoupment, but for simplicity's 
sake I presume fixed expenditures. Second, government capture of 
revenues is a good thing; taxation, in this view, is not "theft."1� Third, 
the government needs a good reason to extend favorable monetary 
terms to a particular set of individuals. For example, deciding to cease 
taxing stock-dividend income is proper, according to this view, if the 
government has a goal it can state convincingly (increasing the pool of 
capital available for investment, perhaps), but improper if no such goal 
emerges.181 Fourth, tax rules affect the quantity of revenue that the 
state takes in: I deny that the tax code is infinitely manipulable by 
well-counseled individuals. Fifth, the existence of antecedent legal 
categories and consequences influences the content of tax legislation. 
Whereas, in principle, tax law could contain infinite variety and ex­
perimentation, preexisting concepts limit the effect of imagination. 
Sixth, transparency is good and opacity is bad. When these stipulations 
are granted, marriage becomes a source of direct fiscal detriment, as 
well as of various benefits, to the American public.182 
179. Readers and workshop audiences surprised me by finding this claim more ques­
tionable and objectionable than anything else in this Article. (I had assumed that exploring a 
'radical' abolition thesis would offend, but apparently it didn't.) The criticisms vary; I note 
them below as they arise. See infra notes 181-182. One notion that these commentators share 
is that the taxing and spending of revenues is a struggle among interest groups rather than an 
exercise in applied justice. Because no group has an a priori entitlement to money, it be­
comes absurd to speak of the "benefits" or "detriments" of any distributional outcome. 
180. "Taxation as theft" gets an airing in J.R. Kearl, Do Entitlements Imply that Taxa­
tion is Theft?, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 74, 74-81 (1977). Kearl concludes that the answer is no. 
For arguments that taxation is illegitimate, see Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Book Review, 
Epstein's Takings Doctrine and the Public-Goods Problem, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 1233, 1242 
(1987). Hummel summarizes the view that "natural rights" require "the taxless society." Id. ; 
see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 169 (1974) ("Taxation of earn­
ings from labor is on a par with forced labor."). 
181. My colleague Bill Camey points out correctly that here I neglect interest group 
theories of public choice. My stance is judgmental: I do not believe that all duly enacted laws 
are equally sound or wise. Put another way, I mean to distinguish good from bad legislation, 
recognizing that the latter kind of lawmaking does occur. 
182. Some readers of this sentence note that state-sponsored marriage does not itself 
cause the state to forgo revenue; instead, legislation that recognizes marriage effects this 
consequence. This criticism is true enough, but I am making a simpler point: "Imagine 
there's no marriage." See supra note 19 and text accompanying note 40 (noting Patricia 
Cain's article of that title). What then? Among other effects, the state would collect more 
money in taxes. If state-sponsored marriage were abolished, legislators could revise the tax 
code. Right now, the subsidy forgoes revenue. 
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1. Social Security Income 
The federal government disburses Social Security transfer pay­
ments on the basis of marriage, and not only on the basis of need.183 
Persons eligible for Social Security income are also eligible for 
Medicare. Given that financially secure people are more likely to be 
married than poor people,184 government policies that allot public 
funds to individuals on the basis of marriage tend to subsidize the well­
off at the expense of the less prosperous. Social Security becomes a 
primary detriment of state-sponsored marriage, then, because of its 
regressive effects (and the lack of a rationale to support transfers from 
poorer to richer persons). 
2. Income Tax Revenue Foregone 
A short survey of the federal tax consequences of state-sponsored 
marriage - omitting comparable effects on state income tax reve­
nues185 - reveals various negative impacts to the fisc. Income taxation 
is the kind of tax with the most pronounced marriage-related conse­
quences; estate and gift tax revenues are also reduced by the recogni­
tion of taxpayers as married. 
In 1948, the United States took the eccentric step of creating a 
marital joint tax return, recognizing the married couple as a single tax­
paying entity at their election.186 Married couples need not file a joint 
return, but almost all married individuals who file tax returns choose 
183. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2000). The entitlement is known formally as the Old Age, Survi­
vors, and Disability Insurance Program. I use "Social Security" because this term is simpler 
and more familiar, and for my purposes will cause no confusion. 
184. See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text. 
185. About four-fifths of the states impose income taxes on their residents, generally 
following the Internal Revenue Code's definition of marital status. Kristian D. Whitten, 
Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Is Marriage Reserved to the States?, 26 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 419, 452 (1999). Domestic partners in California may not file joint 
income tax returns, so long as the federal government holds to its current definition of mar­
riage. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(g) (West 2004) ("[D]omestic partners shall use the same 
filing status as is used on their federal income tax returns, or that would have been used had 
they filed federal income tax returns."). In Vermont, however, parties to a civil union enjoy 
the same status with respect to Vermont income tax "as if federal income tax law recognized 
a civil union in the same manner as Vermont law." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5812 (2003). 
186. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 
1412-14 (1975); see also Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A 
Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 4 & n.15 (2000) (explaining that of the twenty­
seven member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
the United States joins only seven other countries in providing for a joint marital return; the 
other nineteen nations impose income taxes separately on spouses) [hereinafter Zelenak, 
Doing Something About Marriage Penalties]. A 2001 government report in Canada reaf­
firmed the Canadian choice to tax individuals rather than families. LA w COMM'N OF 
CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY 38-43 (2001). 
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to do so because the joint return almost always reduces their tax li­
abilities.187 Contemporary justifications of the joint return focus on 
what Lawrence Zelenak has called "couples neutrality" - the princi­
ple that each couple should be treated the same as another couple with 
the same income.188 Without artificial intervention from the joint re­
turn and without tinkering to combat "the marriage penalty," a couple 
made up of one high-earning spouse and one spouse earning little or 
no wage income (for example, a $120,000 husband married to a $0 
wife) would pay much more in taxes than a couple of two middle­
earners with the same total income (each earning $60,000, say) be­
cause of the brackets that characterize progressive taxation.189 
Couples neutrality is an extraordinary concept, no less for having 
been taken for granted.190 Professor Zelenak concisely notes the 
stakes: "There is no way to design an income tax which (1) is progres­
sive, (2) achieves marriage neutrality (no marriage bonuses or penal­
ties) , and (3) achieves couples neutrality."191 No more than two of the 
three aspects can exist in any system. Forced to choose, the Internal 
Revenue Code has clung to the least justified, and least justifiable, of 
the three desiderata. The principle of progressivity rests on a well­
crafted philosophical and political base and enjoys wide support.192 
The principle of what might be called "marriage neutrality" has re­
ceived extensive endorsement in an array of statutes and judicial deci­
sions.193 No comparable extrinsic source of support buttresses couples 
neutrality. No groundswell of enthusiasm for this kind of neutrality 
supported the invention of the joint return in 1948; couples neutrality 
was a byproduct rather than a purpose of tax reform.194 
Negative consequences to the fisc have followed. A continual hue 
and cry about penalties to married persons notwithstanding, the joint 
return enriches more taxpayers than it burdens. During 1996, the most 
187. See EDWARD MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 16 (1997). 
188. Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties, supra note 186, at 4. 
189. MCCAFFERY, supra note 187, at 19-20. · 
190. Bittker, supra note 186, at 1438 (arguing that the separate returns proposal is "as­
tonishing" because it violates "equality in taxes between married couples with the same 
income"); see also SYLVIA ANN HEWLETI & CORNEL WEST, THE w AR AGAINST PARENTS 
243 (1998) (insisting that "the homemaker penalty" in federal income taxation violates cou­
ples neutrality). 
191. Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV 339, 342 
(1994) [hereinafter Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax]. 
192. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax 
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 504-18 (1987) (expounding on 
philosophical arguments for progressive taxation). 
193. See Crea, supra note 32; Duncan, supra note 32; Jaff, supra note 19; supra notes 58-
60 and accompanying text. 
194. Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, supra note 191 , at 359-60. 
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recent year covered in federal reports, the government lost $4 billion 
that it would have collected if married persons were obliged to file 
separate returns.195 
3. Gift and Estate Tax Revenue Foregone 
"When a well-heeled spouse transfers property to the other spouse 
during the marriage," writes family-law scholar David Chambers, "the 
transfer is not subject to the federal gift tax that would apply to gifts to 
others, including the donor's children."196 A spouse can transfer assets 
to another spouse on divorce without incurring a gift or capital gains 
tax obligation.197 "And when a spouse dies," Chambers continues, 
"bequests to the other spouse are not taxed under federal estate tax 
laws. "198 Intraspousal wealth transfers yield less tax revenue to the 
government than do comparable transfers between persons who are 
not married to each other. 
4. Offsets 
Against these primary detriments, an honest bookkeeper must 
count the utility of marriage to the public fisc. Examples abound. Even 
though the joint return causes the federal government to take in less 
revenue than it would without one, filing jointly as a married couple 
can result in greater tax liability than filing separately as a pair of un­
related adults.199 Gift and estate tax revenue lost to intramarital trans­
fers, though not offset, is frequently recouped in large part when the 
widow or widower dies.200 Criteria to receive transfer payments take 
into account the income of a spouse, in some cases disqualifying an 
indigent person from making a claim on public funds. Marriage can 
rescue indigents, especially women, from poverty, and can prevent an 
individual from becoming a public charge. These quantities are hard to 
count but certainly exist. One can say, however, that the current state 
of transfer-payment policy makes marriage more of a detriment than a 
195. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETrER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1 (June 1997), available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/Oxx/doc7/marriage.pdf. 
196. Chambers, supra note 87, at 474. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 195, at 1-6. 
200. I thank my colleague Jeffrey Pennell for reminding me of this point. 
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benefit to the public fisc: means-based welfare payments have 
shrunk,201 and marriage-inducement payments continue to rise. 
B. Secondary Detriments 
In contrast to the primary effects of state-sponsored marriage, 
which relate directly to the public fisc as a matter of statutory law, sec­
ondary detriments come from regulated activities in which statutory 
law takes a strong regulatory interest, but does not expressly decree 
particular consequences. These secondary effects result indirectly from 
governmental recognition of marriage. Their price tag includes non­
monetary detriments and costs to individuals who do not comply with 
a marriage-favoring posture in the law, as well as monetary 
effects. 
1 .  Private Insurance and Pension Benefits 
State-sponsored marriage establishes a convention for the distribu­
tion of private-sector employment benefits, of which health and life 
insurance are the most significant. To the extent that employers would 
have chosen not to provide this insurance but feel compelled to follow 
this convention, spouses receive benefits that they would not receive 
but for the fact of their state-sponsored marriage. And to the extent 
that persons covered as spouses rather than employees obtain eco­
nomic benefit from this coverage, fellow policyholders underwrite this 
benefit, providing an unexamined and unjustified transfer on the basis 
of marriage·. 
The law abets this underwriting of marriage in several ways. Fore­
most is the Internal Revenue Code position that the furnishing of in­
surance benefits to employees' spouses does not constitute a taxable 
transfer of income.202 Several states have also codified the convention 
that spouses are entitled to workplace-based health insurance benefits, 
compelling employers to insure workers' spouses when they insure the 
workers themselves, if the spouses are uninsured.203 Insurance law 
sometimes frowns on permitting any individual to ensure the life of an 
201. On the shrinking of means-based welfare spending, see Ralph Scharnau, Several 
Factors Undermine Success of Welfare Reform, TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa), 
Feb. 3, 2002, at Al9. 
202. I.RC. § 105(b) (2000); Cain, supra note 19, at 40 n.75; Chambers, supra note 87, at 
474. By contrast, the furnishing of insurance benefits to domestic partners is taxable to the 
recipient. See Interview by HRC FamilyNet with Lara Schwartz, Senior Counsel, Human 
Rights Campaign, HRC Expert Talks About Taxes, Other Financial Issues Facing GLBT 
Families, http://www.hrc.org/Content/ContentGroups/News_Releases/20031/HRC_Expert_ 
Talks_About_Taxes,_Other_Financial_Issues_Facing_GLBT_Families.htm (Apr. 8, 2003). 
203. Chambers, supra note 87, at 484. 
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unrelated adult, a stance that can wreak havoc in the financial lives of 
couples who cannot marry.204 These stances in the law subsidize mar­
riage at the expense of employers and other individuals who partici­
pate in insurance pools. In addition to intervening in the distribution 
of insurance benefits and also decreeing, or at least facilitating, trans­
fers to individuals based on their marital status, the law has often de­
clined to enforce vigorously its rules that prohibit insurers from dis­
criminating on the basis of marriage.205 
Regarding "qualified" pensions (meaning pensions that are eligible 
for tax deferral and employer deductions), federal law compels each 
employer to pay an annuity to the spouse of a participant worker when 
the participant retires or dies.206 This annuity is designed to pay "the 
actuarial equivalent of 50% of the participant's vested benefit, con­
verted to the form of a lifetime annuity."207 Spouses receive guaran­
teed pension benefits even when the retirement plan is of the "defined 
contribution" type, now ascendant over the "defined benefit" type.208 
In the "defined contribution" plan, which includes 401(k) accounts, 
the participant is often free to withdraw the amount she has accrued, 
or use it as collateral for a personal loan. Despite this degree of par-
204. The "insurable interest" requirement, which originated in common law, has been 
codified in about half the states. Franklin L. Best, Jr., Defining Insurable Interests in Lives, 22 
TORT & INS. L.J. 104, 105 & n.9 (1986). Under this doctrine, a policy issued to a person 
lacking an insurable interest in the contingency is an illegal contract that may give rise to tort 
liability. Id. One anecdote on point is provided in E.J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 40 
(1999). Graff recounts how she and her partner faced a home mortgage lender that required 
the two women to insure each other's lives; when Graff and her partner tried to comply, they 
learned that insurers would not recognize an insurable interest between two "unrelated" 
women. Id. 
205. Jennifer Jaff writes that as a single woman she was turned down for renter's insur­
ance in Miami because the insurer required policyholders to declare that some responsible 
person would stay home in the insured residence during the day, notwithstanding a Florida 
law prohibiting marital-status discrimination. Jaff, supra note 19, at 214. Whether Florida 
regulators did not deem the insurer's policy to be related to marital status (after all, the per­
son trapped inside the house did not have to be a lawful wife) or simply did not care about 
the company policy is unknown; what is known, beyond Florida, is that insurance law pro­
hibiting discrimination is sparsely enforced. See H. Jane Lehman, Tests Uncover Rampant 
Bias in Home Insurance Process, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15, 1995, § 16, at 1 (reporting results of 
undercover testing); Gregory D. Squires, Let the Sun Shine In on Propeny Insurance, NAT'L 
UNDERWRITER, Sept. 3, 2001, at 25 ("State regulators have simply not regulated in this 
area."). 
206. I.RC. § 401(a)(ll)(A)(ii) (2003). The only exception to this requirement arises 
when the spouse consents to an alternative type of payment. Jonathan Barry Forman, Whose 
Pension is It Anyway? Protecting Spousal Rights in a Privatized Social Security System, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1666-67 (1998). 
207. David A Pratt, Nor Rhyme Nor Reason: Simplifying Defined Contribution Plans, 
49 BUFF. L. REV. 741, 835 (2001). 
208. On the rise of "defined contribution" over "defined benefit," see Michael J .  Collins, 
Reviving Defined Benefit Plans: Analysis and Suggestions for Reform, 20 VA. TAX REV. 599, 
604, 608-09 (2001). 
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ticipant freedom, the participant's spouse can count on an annuity 
when the participant dies or retires.209 
For an unmarried participant, by contrast, the benefits of a quali­
fied pension dwindle. An unmarried participant may designate a bene­
ficiary to receive a post-retirement benefit. If she dies before she 
retires, however, nobody collects an annuity. Under this scheme, man­
dated by federal law, employers and unmarried workers underwrite 
benefits for spouses.210 
2. Religion as a Shield 
American law occasionally allows individuals and entities to use 
religion to achieve immunity from legal liability. Behaviors otherwise 
prohibited - that is, elsewhere identified as detrimental - become 
acceptable in a religious context. Because of their partial exemption 
from antidiscrimination mandates, religious institutions can practice 
discrimination on the basis of marital status while enjoying the support 
of law.211 
Marriage- and religion-related detriments that the law condones 
include discrimination against employees on the basis of martial 
status212 and breaches of religiously based marital contracts. The para­
digm contracts of this kind are the Jewish ketubot that give a husband 
the unilateral power to initiate a religious divorce, and permit him to 
withhold it from his wife}13 The treatment of religion in American law 
continues to bolster detriments related to marital status.214 
209. See generally Forman, supra note 206, at 1669-71. 
210. For an account of one unmarried worker's frustration with this state of pension law, 
see Michelle Conlin, Unmarried America, Bus. WK., Oct. 20, 2003, at 106. 
211 .  If state-sponsored marriage were abolished, this opportunity would not go away: 
religious institutions could discriminate on the basis of nongovernmental marriage. State­
sponsored marriage does, however, facilitate this tendency: it makes marital status easy to 
look up and straightforward to ascribe. 
212. See Little v. Wuehl, 929 F.2d 944, 945 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the religious 
exemption to Title VII permitted a Catholic school to refuse to renew the contract of a 
Protestant teacher who remarried in defiance of church teaching). In Dotter v. Wahlert High 
School, 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa 1980), the plaintiff schoolteacher was fired by her 
Catholic institutional employer when she became pregnant out of wedlock. The court agreed 
to hear the claim only as one of sex discrimination, not marital-status discrimination. Id. 
213. See Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523, 525 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (refusing, on 
First Amendment grounds, to compel a husband to give his wife a get, or Jewish divorce, 
thereby leaving the wife unable to remarry within her community). 
214. The rise of federal faith-based initiatives has diverted money from child-support 
programs to religious organizations "so they can promote marriage." Siobhan McDonough, 
Religious Groups Get Federal Grants to Promote Marriage, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 2003, § 1, at 
20. Recipients of these expenditures see their efforts as benign, but all marriage-promotion 
efforts inherently contain a detrimental aspect, even if it is nothing worse than the lecturing 
or hectoring of a captive audience. The religious identity of those who receive funding for 
faith-based programs hinders scrutiny of what they do with their expenditures - a condition 
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3. Frustrating Worthy Creditors 
Marriage, as a shelter of assets, shields deserving and undeserving 
debtors alike. An observer can speculate infinitely about the worthi­
ness or unworthiness of creditors whose attempts to collect on a debt 
are frustrated by marriage-based shields like the opportunity to title 
assets in a spouse's name. Who deserves the asset more, the creditor 
or the married debtor? One cannot know. One can know, however, 
that legal shelters protecting individuals based on their marriage, 
rather than another trait more clearly pertinent to their status as debt­
ors, can hinder the optimal collection and payment of debt. 
An example is the use of tenancy by the entirety to obstruct the 
collection of child support payments. In the name of marriage, a delin­
quent parent can use tenancy by the entirety to prevent a seizure of 
property to pay for the support of children from a prior marriage or 
relationship. One commentator has found the problem nontrivial in 
practice,215 notwithstanding the modern decline of tenancy by the en­
tirety and the supposed panoply of remedies available to enforce child 
support obligations.216 Commercial creditors can be more or less de­
serving. Favoring delinquent obligors over their children, who are enti­
tled to support, however, privileges one type of law-based family 
relation over a different law-based family relation that inherently con­
tains more vulnerability. 
4. Offsets 
The secondary detriments of marriage complement a set of gains, 
which take form as liberties. Marriage is a site of condoned inequality, 
but when enforced as government policy, equality comes at the ex­
pense of freedom.217 Freedom of contract and freedom of religion off­
set (and may justify) some secondary detriments of marriage. Freeing 
employees to reject insurance coverage for their spouses as well as to 
that turned Congress against faith-based initiatives, compelling President Bush to install 
them by executive order. See id. 
215. Robert D. Null, Note, Tenancy by the Entirety as an Asset Shield: An Unjustified 
Safe Haven for Delinquent Child Support Obligors, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1057, 1090-93 (1995). 
216. On the decline of tenancy by the entirety, see supra Part I.C.5. Several authors 
discuss the range of measures available to deter and punish child support arrears. See Jillian 
Lloyd, When Do Stiff Penalties for Deadbeat Parents Go Too Far?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Mar. 25, 1999, at 2 (noting trend toward criminalizing nonpayment of child sup­
port); John Wagner, New Law Allows Crackdown on Child Support, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh), Dec. 31, 1995, at Bl (describing measures taken in North Carolina, including 
"most wanted" posters featuring parents in arrears, withheld driver's licenses, and expanded 
wage garnishing). 
217. See generally NOZICK, supra note 180 (positing that equality and liberty are in per­
petual tension). 
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collect it without tax liability creates options - that is, liberty - for 
these workers. 
Yet along with its complement of secondary gains, the category of 
secondary detriments gives reason for concern about transparency. 
Secondary detriments are veiled. Even sophisticated adults seldom 
know the origins of such everyday truths as the "natural" link between 
marriage and insurance; even judges become vexed over the question 
of how much freedom a religious enterprise should enjoy from the rig­
ors of antidiscrimination law.218 The force of law underwrites these 
secondary effects, but in an only vaguely estimable quantity. Because 
they partake of both private-sector prerogatives and law-sponsored 
encouragement of particular choices, these consequences can escape 
accountability in a way that fiddling with, say, "the marriage penalty" 
- a clearly primary maneuver - never achieves. In order to compare 
offsets against detriments, those who make and observe policy need a 
sharper sense of how partial regulation makes marriage-favoring out­
comes appear spontaneous, or derived from the neutral workings of 
freedom. 
C. Tertiary Detriments 
Norms are the best-studied example of quasi-legal sources of 
regulation that, though neither codified nor judicially decreed, never­
theless predict and partially govern behavior.219 Marriage-related 
norms that have detrimental effects fall into the tertiary category be­
cause the law neither causes them directly, as is the case with primary 
detriments, nor facilitates them through partial regulatory involve­
ment, as is the case with secondary detriments. Of the three categories, 
"tertiary" is the least precise, the most debatable, and the furthest re­
moved from quantifiable financial consequences. 
The tertiary detriments of marriage can emerge only after one de­
termines what to compare to what. To those who look at marriage as a 
legal category, adverse effects emerge with particular clarity when one 
contrasts heterosexual couplings unrecognized by the state, on the one 
218. See Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for 
Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1 128 
(1996). 
219. Norms are everywhere. In our context of marriage, for instance, all but two presi­
dents of the United States, James Buchanan and Grover Cleveland, followed a norm that a 
man must be married at the time of the campaign in order to win this office. Michael 
Farquhar, Hail to the Chiefs, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2002, at C16 (noting that Buchanan never 
married and Cleveland had not yet married when he was elected). Other norms say that the 
president should not have ever been divorced, nor have married a divorced woman; he is 
also not supposed to have extramarital sex while in office. Though flouted by 
Presidents Reagan, Ford, Kennedy, and Clinton respectively (and perhaps by others), these 
norms retain some force. 
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hand, with state-sponsored marriage, on the other. State-sponsored 
marriage has several deleterious consequences when compared with 
informal pairing. By privileging one type of union over another,220 it 
stigmatizes cohabitation as less privileged. It makes a breakup from 
the sanctioned union more difficult, expensive, and slow. As we have 
seen elsewhere, distinct benefits undeniably offset these detriments, 
but the costs nevertheless should not be overlooked in a quasi­
utilitarian celebration of marriage. 
Cohabitation is not the only alternative to marriage; many adults 
neither cohabit nor marry. Unpartnered and same-sex-partnered per­
sons also get hurt by tertiary detriments. State sponsorship establishes 
the gender-dimorphous dyad as the preferred way to arrange one's 
private life.221 An uncounted, unaudited, barely questioned, and virtu­
ally sacred legal stance in favor of marriage - a subsidy that as we 
have seen causes billions of dollars to change hands each year - sends 
a message of privilege that extends beyond money. "It's a [heterosex­
ual] couples' world," the discontented say.222 Laments from single 
adults, homosexually or bisexually oriented persons, and husbands or 
wives who feel social pressure locking them inside miserable marriages 
are familiar to the point of cliche. Not fair, we hear, to deprive the 
unmarried of marriage-related privileges.223 Unhappiness about ideo­
logical subsidy is, indeed, far more prevalent than unhappiness about 
any financial perks. Such nonmonetary inequity, though hard to meas­
ure and count, is amenable to the quasi-utilitarian reckoning that the 
"case for marriage" invites. Ideological subsidy is a good investment if 
society is better off with it: single persons, homosexually and bisexu­
ally oriented persons, and persons who resent the pressure favoring 
marriage may feel that the ideology persecutes them, but the gains of 
favoring that which is advantageous to the public can outweigh the 
social losses of their distress. It is wrong, however, to proceed with a 
pro-marriage legislative agenda as if these losses and detriments did 
not exist. 
Like their cousins of the primary and secondary type, tertiary det­
riments contain built-in offsets. What you call stigmatization could be 
to me a principled preference for something good over something bad. 
220. See generally Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me, Bill: The Case for 
Keeping Marriage (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (comparing cohabi­
tation with marriage). 
221. See supra Part 11.C.2 (describing favoritism). 
222. For invocations of this phrase, see Lisa Kochanowski, Group Offers Outlet for 
Widows, Widowers, S. BEND TRIB., Mar. 31, 2002, at Cl; Kim Ode, Divorce Might Not Be as 
Contagious as We Think, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 8, 2002, at E4. 
223. Miller, supra note 1 16 (recounting whining); see also Jaff, supra note 19 (arguing 
that marital status should be a source of neither benefits nor detriments). 
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Slowed and burdensome parting for some equals a brake on reckless 
impulses for others. The point, again, is not to take a measure of mar­
riage, but rather to survey what a reputable measurer would want to 
count. The following discussion considers a few among many ill ef­
fects. 
1. The Gender Gap in Gains from Marriage 
Just as bylines identify women as relatively skeptical about mar­
riage and men relatively enthusiastic about it,224 wives report that they 
do not enjoy their married lives as much as their husbands do.225 The 
"case for marriage" prefers to put the point more positively: both men 
and women benefit from marriage, but men benefit more. The most 
dramatic gains of marriage redound to men as individuals, rather than 
to women: men who marry win significantly higher income, much bet­
ter health, and longer life,226 but for women, the gains occasioned by 
marrying are relatively modest, and the picture more mixed. The im­
proved health that married women enjoy is almost entirely a function 
of money - specifically, their husbands' extra income and health in­
surance.227 Single women live longer after heart attacks than married 
women.228 Many married women in the workforce fare poorly there: 
divorced women earn more than both married and never-married 
women,229 and motherhood, a condition that frequently accompanies 
women's marriage, depresses women's wages and job opportunities.230 
Getting married reduces depression for men but not for women,231 and 
· the question of whether married women or single women suffer more 
224. For a citation of classic feminist criticisms of marriage, see Martha Chamallas, Con· 
sent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 788 n.49 
(1988). See also supra note 19 (noting that most authors who criticize or attack marriage are 
women). Paeans to marriage come more often from men than women, and gay men, includ­
ing David Chambers, William Eskridge, and Andrew Sullivan, are noted for their eloquent 
praise of marriage as an institution that should be opened to same-sex couples. Of course, 
many women are very grateful for, and admiring of, marriage. 
225. HACKER, supra note 28, at 28 (noting wives' greater discontent); Karen S. 
Peterson, Why Men Drag Their Feet Down the Aisle, USA TODAY, June 26, 2002, at SD 
("Women often see marriage as a better deal for men than for women, providing a man with 
steady sex, a caretaker for the kids, a social planner, a domestic servant, and a second -
sometimes larger - paycheck."). 
226. Ken Dempsey, Who Gets the Best Deal from Marriage: Women or Men?, 38 J. Soc. 
91 (2002). 
227. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111 ,  at 60. 
228. Steve Sternberg, After Heart Attack, Can Kindness Kill?, USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 
2002, at 010. 
229. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111 ,  at 107 n.28. 
230. Ann Crittenden estimates she lost a million dollars in wage income because she 
became a mother. See CRITIENDEN, supra note 173, at 87-109. 
231. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111 ,  at 70-71. 
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from depression remains unresolved. Sticking with an unhappy mar­
riage seems to benefit men, but "[w]omen who stay in bad marriages 
become depressed, exhibit lowered immune functioning and are more 
likely to abuse alcohol than women who get out."232 
Marriage partisans acknowledge the gender gap between men's 
and women's experiences of marriage, but insist that it does not hurt 
their argument. Yes, they concede, marriage contains two halves.233 If 
his were to thrive at the expense of hers, one might worry about the 
goodness of the institution, they say; but as long as both men and 
women benefit from marriage, why worry?234 This stance is at odds 
with widely held contemporary views of justice that propel the welfare 
state to ameliorate distributional inequities,235 and with utilitarianism 
itself, the normative foundation that advocates have chosen to under­
lie their secular "case for marriage." Studies report that game-player 
parties reject positive-sum bargains when they feel that other partici­
pants are taking advantage of them, an embarrassment to hardcore 
utilitarianism sometimes explained as evincing "a taste for fairness."236 
Sharply delineated gender differences favoring men over women in 
any social practice bespeak a problem, not a policy cure-all. 
With marriage, the problematic conditions are easy to see, not 
buried under microeconomic simulations or abstract conceptions of 
justice. Women gain wealth from marriage because they gain vicarious 
access to the favored gender's paycheck. Their health improves be­
cause they are married to health insurance: their lower-paying jobs, 
and their inferior access to employment-based medical insurance, keep 
232. Stephanie Coontz, Marriage Can't Be the Only Accepted Commitment, NEWSDAY, 
May 27, 2001, at BS. 
233. Sociologist Jessie Bernard won fame for saying that every marriage contains two 
marriages, his and hers, and "hers" needs repair. BERNARD, supra note 145, at 1. 
234. See David Popenoe, The Top Ten Myths of Marriage, National Marriage Project, at 
http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/pubmyths%20of%20marriage.htm (Mar. 2002) 
(claiming that the gains are virtually equal for men and women because women gain signifi­
cant "financial advantages") [hereinafter Popenoe, The Top Ten Myths of Marriage]. 
235. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 278 (1971) (propounding an entitlement 
to baseline support); see also NORMAN FROLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING 
JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY 58 (1992) (reporting find­
ings that most people would rather have average utility with a welfare floor than the oppor­
tunity to hold great gains without a floor); Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality, 
and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415, 422-28 (2003) (defending redistribution). 
236. See Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1995 
(2002) (quoting LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 21  
(2002)). For elaboration in the context of  marriage, see Amy L.  Wax, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 590 
(1998) (citing ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME 
THEORY 229 (1989), and Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253, 266-74 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995)). Wax 
notes that the decision to divorce a spouse who insists on lopsided bargains may reflect an 
independent "taste for equity." Id. 
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them away from the health care resources given more generously to 
working men. Unlike men, who earn more as married fathers 
than as childless bachelors, women suffer a loss in wages when they 
become parents - forcing them to choose, when they have children, 
between straitened single motherhood and marriage-dependent wifely 
sacrifice - 237 that is, if they have a choice: some women fail to attain 
marriage even though they want it, and others get discarded by hus­
bands who no longer want them.238 Such inequities are not obscure or 
trivial. By initiating most divorces, despite (probably) knowing that 
divorce is costly, women manifest a "taste for equity," which utilitari­
ans admit can outweigh the desire for gain.239 If many women prefer 
the hardships of "equity" to the goods of marriage, perhaps these 
goods are insufficient to support marriage as policy. 
2. Tertiary Consequences of Primary Detriments: Social Security and 
Income Tax 
Social Security subsidizes stay-at-home wives at the expense of 
working wives. A married woman is entitled to benefits calculated on 
a basis of half her husband's earnings.240 Alternatively, if she too par­
ticipated in the labor market, she receives either the amount credited 
to her own earnings or the amount credited to the stay-at-home share, 
whichever is greater. Consequently, if during her years in the 
workforce she did not outearn the "traditional" allotment, all of her 
contributions (made in the form of Social Security taxes) go unrepaid. 
Historians report that these rules were written with the explicit pur­
pose of keeping women home;241 regardless of their original purpose, 
they perpetuate the incentive. The tradition of keeping women out 
237. This phrasing omits two sources of gain for mothers: the utility of childrearing 
(which is available to all mothers), and the benefits of sharing in a husband's income (avail­
able to mothers who are married to wage-earning men). These gains are significant, and may 
help explain why most women become mothers despite the price, but they have already 
taken up a lot of space in public discussion. Elise Bruhl, Motherhood and Contract: Always 
Crashing in the Same Car, 9 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 191-99 (2000) (noting extravagant 
rhetorical homage to motherhood). For the sake of balance, I have buried the oft-stated 
good news in the footnote, and placed the less-stated bad news in the text. 
238. See HACKER, supra note 28, at 27 (noting that although wives initiate most di-
vorces, this generalization does not hold for older divorcing couples). 
239. Wax, supra note 236, at 590. 
240. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2), (c)(3) (1994). 
241. Alice Kessler-Harris, Designing Women and Old Fools: The Construction of the 
Social Security Amendments of 1939, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN'S HISTORY 101 (Linda K. 
Kerber et al. eds., 1995). 
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of the labor market is strengthened in a patriarchal view of the 
provider. 242 
Encouraged to avoid the labor market, women are also encouraged 
to stay in their marriages until death. When it comes time to receive 
Social Security payments, widows collect one hundred percent of the 
benefit that reflects their late husbands' contributions, but women 
whose marriages ended in divorce collect no more than fifty percent, 
and then only if they were married to the husband in question for at 
least ten years.243 This allotment puts a woman in a bind. If she stays at 
home the way the Social Security system encourages women to do, she 
risks losing significant benefits upon divorce {less than half of all mar­
riages that end in divorce make it to ten years). If she stays at work, 
chances are her Social Security contributions will add up to no addi­
tional benefit for her. Meanwhile, much of her economic fate rides on 
her husband's decision not to divorce her - a decision she cannot con­
trol, but can encourage through a pliant, he-comes-first marital atti­
tude (or, perhaps, through assurances that divorce will be costly 
to him). 
Tertiary detriments related to the Social Security treatment of 
marriage inflict injury on the basis of race as well as gender. First, 
African-American wives are more likely than white wives to have 
worked outside the home for money;244 the subsidy of stay-at-home 
wives redounds to the benefit of white couples and the detriment of 
African Americans. Second, African Americans are more likely than 
Caucasian Americans to be single.245 Social Security rules that reward 
marriage, then, reward Caucasian taxpayers at the expense of African-
242. MCCAFFERY, supra note 187, at 193. But see Nada Eissa, Book Review, 37 J .  
ECON. LITERATURE 683, 684-85 (1999) (criticizing McCaffery for ignoring the significant 
minority of married women who earn more than their husbands). 
243. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2000); MCCAFFERY, supra note 187, at 97-98. 
244. One study found that 63.2% of African-American wives were working outside the 
home in 2000, compared to 59.8% of white wives. T. Shawn Taylor, Time Crunch Clobbers 
Working Families, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB . ,  Sept. 18, 2002, at Gl. The figure for African 
Americans is probably too low, because African-American women take up informal, off-the­
books jobs more than do white women. See Alison Stein Wellner, The Two Worlds of 
Women, FORECAST, Oct. 22, 2002, at 1 .  Earnings from informal employment are generally 
not subject to Social Security payroll taxes, which means that the worker can take home 
more of her wage, but also cannot benefit from her own contributions when she retires. 
245. Jay D. Teachman et al., The Changing Demography of America's Families, 62 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1234, 1236-39 (2000) (noting that African Americans are less likely than 
Caucasians to marry at any point in their lives, to convert a nonmarital union into marriage, 
and to remarry after divorce); id. at 1238 (reporting that in 1990, thirty-five percent of white 
women aged forty to forty-four had experienced at least one divorce, whereas for African­
American women the figure was forty-five percent). The trend is growing stronger: of all 
black women in their early forties, 58.3% were currently married in 1970, and 40.3% were 
currently married in 2000. HACKER, supra note 28, at 160-61. 
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American taxpayers.246 Unsurprisingly, given this racial divide, transfer 
payments to assist needy children and their caregivers are considered 
pathological ("welfare as we know it"),247 while transfer payments for 
widowed and disabled persons stay respectable, a kind of insurance. 
To those who say that African Americans can easily cross over to the 
favored side by marrying, a sizeable literature responds that single 
African Americans report sound reasons for refusing this option, or 
are single for reasons other than choice.248 
Income tax rules also press women to comply with patriarchal tra­
ditions. Like many other values that invoke "neutrality," couples neu­
trality in income tax policy harbors a pointed political agenda. Focus­
ing on a couple rather than an individual as a taxpaying unit, the con­
cept encourages the spouses to live in a particular way qua couple. As 
scholars have demonstrated, it is impossible for a tax system that re­
spects "couples neutrality" to avoid favoring either an egalitarian or a 
traditional pattern of wage attribution within each marriage.249 The 
246. See Conlin, supra note 210, at 106 (noting that "one out of every three black male 
youths will pay for retirement benefits they will never see"). See generally Dorothy A. 
Brown, The Abolition of Marriage Movement from a Tax Policy Perspective: Only Certain 
Women Need Apply (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (pointing out 
racial consequences of facially neutral federal spending policies). 
247. In his 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton pledged to abolish "welfare as we 
know it." Ross K. Baker, Nimble Presidents Can Change Views, Still Succeed in Long Run, 
USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 2003, at 21A. 
248. See Edin, supra note 150; see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY 
DISADVANTAGED 90-92 (1987) (evaluating African-American women's reasons for rejecting 
marriage); Linda McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 393-95 
(1996) (summarizing "structural factors" that discourage marriage in both African-American 
and lower-income communities). 
249. One writer uses the alien-planet device to good effect here: 
Imagine landing on the planet Ames, discovering that human life inhabits it, and that, like 
Earth, two things are inevitable: death and taxes. Upon learning that the Amesians have an 
income tax system, your first impulse is to examine it in the hope of discovering how the 
Amesians live, how they think, and what they believe. In doing so, you learn the following. 
The government pays male Amesians to marry females who do not work. When a female 
Amesian who does work marries, by law her income is cut. In fact, the Amesian government 
discourages her from working at all after marrying. By contrast, when a male marries, his in­
come is automatically increased. Perhaps most astonishing of all is the phenomenon in which 
most female Amesians pay their husbands every year for the privilege of being married to 
them, even when the female earns significantly less than her husband. Each year at tax time, 
there is, in effect, a massive transfer of wealth from the married women in the population to 
their husbands . . . .  
Later, after returning to Earth, lamenting your misfortune, and pondering the oddities of 
the Amesian tax code, you still cannot believe that seemingly intelligent beings would devise 
a tax system with such overt bias against females, one that departed so dramatically from 
neutral principles. You decide to establish interplanetary communications and to ask the 
Amesians why they chose a tax system with such an egregious impact on females. You gain 
access to a government satellite, transmit your inquiry to the Amesians, and a few weeks 
later, their reply arrives: "We got our tax system from you. It is a copy of your U.S. tax code. 
We have been watching you Americans for years. As we study your society, we adopt some 
of your more salient customs." 
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couples-neutrality concept is not particularly neutral. For instance, it 
presumes that husbands and wives pool their income - a gross over­
simplification of reality at best.250 Perhaps it is also a coercive intrusion 
into domestic arrangements; attitudinal surveys report that men favor 
marital pooling of income more than women do.251 
3. The Tax on Stepmothers' Resources 
Within marriages that blend preexisting families, stepmotherhood 
is a tough assignment. Fewer than twenty percent of young adult chil­
dren in stepfamilies feel close to their stepmothers, an unhappy out­
come that one observer attributes to the stepmother role leaving a 
woman "caught in the middle, expected to be a nurturer of sometimes 
difficult and suspicious children."252 Stepmothers report significant dis­
content and frustration within their marriages, strains that frequently 
coexist with financial strife.253 Informal counterparts to stepmother­
hood, though perhaps equally trying, or more so, would be easier than 
marriage to escape. 
4. Detriments to Children 
Paeans to the two-parent family have so filled public discussion254 
that one who undertakes the task of bookkeeping must go to some 
trouble to count the ways that state-sponsored marriage can hurt chil­
dren. A two-parent household (containing original parents, that is, 
rather than a stepparent) unmarred by rifts between the two adults is a 
fine place to grow up - probably the best possible environment for a 
child, all else being equal. But the "case for marriage" praises the insti­
tution categorically, not just the serene households that comprise a 
fraction of all marriages. And the category of marriage includes varia­
tions that leave children worse off. 
Two recurring patterns, neither of them rare, cause children to suf­
fer in marriage. The first pattern is the bitter marriage filled with open 
Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the Gendered 
Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241, 241-42 (1997). 
250. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, 
and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 106 (1993). 
251. PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 94-103 (1983). 
252. Karen S. Peterson, Kids, Parents Can Make the Best of Divorce, USA TODAY, Jan. 
14, 2002, at lA. 
253. See GLYNNIS WALKER, SECOND WIFE, SECOND BEST? 45-56 (1984 ) .  
254. See Editorial, Encourage Marriage, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 1 ,  2003, at 4A (sum­
marizing findings that commend the two-parent family as the best environment for a child); 
supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting proposed federal-government endorsement of 
the two-parent family). 
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conflict and hostility. Unhappy domesticity can exist without marriage, 
to be sure. But an official union will cement some families together 
long after their mutual misery could have ended by a less formal 
means of separation than state-sponsored divorce. Children fare 
poorly in these households.255 Stephanie Coontz and Nancy Folbre re­
port that although children born to teenagers who were married at the 
time of the birth do better than children born to never-married teen 
parents, children born to teenage parents who married after the birth 
do worse, suggesting that marriage can at least accompany, if not 
cause, the worsening of domestic conditions.256 
The second variation on marriage that can hurt children, referred 
to in the preceding subsection,257 is remarriage, the blending of fami­
lies. Policymakers often manifest a view of marriage as an event writ­
ten on a clean slate - a transition from unsupported isolation to a 
nurturing household.258 But many marriages follow, rather than pre­
cede, the formation of a two-generation family. Particularly among 
low-income populations, the perpetual target of most pro-marriage 
initiatives, newborn children often live with half siblings from their 
parents' previous marriages or relationships.259 State-sponsored mar­
riage often gives birth to a second generation of state-sponsored labels 
- stepmother, stepfather, stepchild - and, as was mentioned, law­
based formality tends to make these new roles harder to dissolve. 
After decades of denial, observers now report that adjusting to a 
new stepfamily is a costly process for a child.260 Compared with chil­
dren who live in households headed by their original two parents, chil-
255. On the effect of unhappy marriages on children, see PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN 
BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL 238 
(1997). The authors claim that "a high-conflict marriage that does not end in divorce" and "a 
low-conflict marriage that does end in divorce" are the two worst family settings for children. 
Id. 
256. Coontz & Folbre, supra note 1 17. 
257. See supra Part IIl.C.3. 
258. See WEITZMAN, supra note 5,  at 153 (noting an "assumption that every marriage is 
a first marriage"); Andrew Cherlin, Remarriage as an Incomplete Institution, 84 AM. J. Soc. 
634 (1978) (arguing that popular denial of the reality of remarriage sows confusion and dis­
tress among people Jiving in blended families). 
259. E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: 
DIVORCE RECONSIDERED 178-79 (2002); BOB SIMPSON, CHANGING FAMILIES (1998); 
Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., The New Extended Family: The Experience of Parents and Chil­
dren After Remarriage, in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING 42, 42-61 (Kay Pasley & 
Marilyn !hinger-Tallman eds., 1987). 
260. See William H. Jeynes, Effects of Remarriage Following Divorce on the Academic 
Achievement of Children, 28 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 385, 386 (1999) (claiming that for 
years researchers preferred to believe without evidence "that parental remarriage generally 
benefited children," probably because remarriage typically generates additional family in­
come or additional caregiving labor, or both). 
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dren who live in stepfamilies fare worse on various indicators.261 As 
was noted, the stepmother-stepchild relationship is particularly diffi­
cult,262 and the harms to children of remarriage increase after re­
remarriage.263 Moreover, remarriages and stepfamily-forming mar­
riages are especially prone to divorce,264 and so, even if remarriage is a 
good cure for what ails the members of an about-to-be-blended family, 
policymakers need to recognize that these pairings often dissolve. 
5. Concealing the Work of Caregiving 
Marriage gives legal sanction to a locus of poorly remunerated and 
poorly measured caregiving work. This work - which can certainly be 
a source of deep satisfaction - includes housecleaning, a range of at­
tentions for children and elderly relatives, emotional labor to benefit 
others in the family (particularly husbands), and compelled deference 
and sacrifice, through which the caregiver is expected to take less, and 
261. See SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE 
PARENT 19-63 (1994). The generalization holds even when researchers control for family 
income. Id.; see also MELVIN KONNER, CHILDHOOD 206 (1991) (finding a heightened risk of 
abuse in stepfamilies); Gloria Albrecht, All Families, All Forms, SIGHTINGS, June 5, 2003, at 
http://marty-center.uchicago.edu/sightings/archive_2003/0605.shtml (noting estimates that 
about ninety percent of children living in original two-parent households score in the normal 
range on adjustment measures, whereas among children in stepfamilies or single-parent 
homes, about seventy-five to eighty percent score in this range). 
262. See Douglas B. Downey, Understanding Academic Achievement Among Children in 
Stephouseholds: The Role of Parental Resources, Sex of Stepparent, and Sex of Child, 73 Soc. 
FORCES 875 (1995) (studying stepmothers). Lending a little credence to the wicked­
stepmother cartoon stereotype, a study of 24,000 British families reported that stepmothers 
and other women living with nonbiologically related children spent less money on "healthy 
foods such as milk, fruit and vegetables" to benefit these children than did biologically re­
lated women, and spent more on alcohol and tobacco. Cherry Norton, 'Wicked Stepmother' 
Myth Backed by Study, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 30, 2000, at 9. For a discussion of the 
continuing valence of the wicked-stepmother myth, in which stepmothers join "wolves, gi­
ants, ogres, and witches" as "representations of evil," see Anne C. Jones, Reconstructing the 
Stepfamily: Old Myths, New Stories, 48 Soc. WORK 228, 229 (2003).  
263. "There's research now that suggests that for children, the sheer number of changes 
in family structure that they have to go through may be more difficult than living with a sin­
gle parent," according to marriage-and-family scholar Andrew Cherlin. "So if we put kids in 
situations where we're going to be changing their living arrangements several times, we 
might put them in more harm than if we just leave them where they are." See Analysis: New 
Federal Welfare Plan to Encourage Marriage (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 13, 2002), for an 
interview by Greg Allen with Andrew Cherlin, Professor, Johns Hopkins University. Consis­
tent with other social-science findings, see supra notes 261-262 and accompanying text, 
Cherlin adds that children in stepfamilies do not do better than single-parent children on the 
teen pregnancy and high school graduation variables. Analysis: New Federal Welfare Plan to 
Encourage Marriage, supra. 
264. HACKER, supra note 28, at 51; see also HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 259, 
at 178-79 (summarizing data about strain in stepfamilies); Wade F. Hom, Step/amities Must 
Work a Little Harder, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001, at El (quoting one estimate that "two of 
three stepfamilies break up"). 
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give more, vis-a-vis others in the household.265 Women bear this bur­
den disproportionately, in their roles of wives and mothers, but the 
burden can also afflict husbands and fathers. Nobody knows how 
much it costs.266 
Concealing caregiving has several distinct detrimental effects, 
including legal conundrums: how to divide property and fix support 
obligations at divorce when the spouse who contributed care and other 
unpaid investments to the relationship lacks legal title to the 
assets that must be allocated to one spouse or the other;267 whether a 
spouse can hold a property interest in her spouse's professional skill 
that she helped to cultivate;268 whether wives may make enforceable 
contracts with their husbands, agreements that would get them com­
pensated for volunteering to take on caregiving obligations;269 and how 
judges can administer the tort remedy of spousal consortium when liti­
gants lack a vocabulary to speak of what it means to lose the benefits 
of this intimate work.270 
The mischief of concealing caregiving goes beyond the law. In a so­
cial climate that esteems both capitalism and marriage, the gendered 
(and racialized) dyad of a wage-earning husband married to a wage­
dependent wife assigns prestige to the husband. Women often feel 
irked by their diminished status; some report ambivalence about, and 
discomfort with, the assigned role of caregiver.271 African-American 
families, in which the gendered-dyad normative structure has less 
265. See Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family 
Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2200 (1995) ("These labors may provide joy, but they are also 
burdensome and have material costs and consequences that go uncompensated within the 
private family."). 
266. The work of New Zealand economist Marilyn Waring is acclaimed for identifying 
and measuring this value. See MARILYN WARING, COUNTING FOR NOTHING: WHAT MEN 
VALUE AND WHAT WOMEN ARE WORTH (2d ed. 1 999). 
267. See AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 33, at § 4.12 (characterizing some property 
as marital and some separate without regard to title, but making no recommendation on this 
question). 
268. Most courts refuse to · recognize such an interest, but some treat earning capacity 
enhanced by a spouse's labors as a factor in property division. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, 
supra note 4, at 719. 
269. Borelli v. Brousseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 19-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (noting the 
wife's preexisting duty to render caregiving labor). 
270. See, e.g., Coho Res., Inc. v. McCarthy, 829 So. 2d 1, 18-23 (Miss. 2002) (noting that 
consortium damages are difficult to determine); Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 817 
(Me. 1986) (Scolnik, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). 
271. See Rebecca J. Erickson, Reconceptualizing Family Work: The Effect of Emotion 
Work on Perceptions of Marital Quality, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 888, 890-95 (1993) (re­
porting that wives become resentful when they believe they are doing too great a share of 
the marriage's emotional work); Katha Pollitt, Utopia, Limited, NATION, July 26, 1996, at 9 
(paraphrasing Amy Wax to contend that "many women find stay-at-home motherhood 
lonely and boring and financial dependence on their husbands 'irksome and humiliating' "). 
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force, often do not fit the pattern, and so women are faulted both for 
working outside the home (critics speak of emasculation of the black 
man272) and for staying home to provide care ("welfare mothers"273). 
Married women of all races, but especially white women, who pursue 
careers sometimes feel accused of neglect and selfishness towards their 
children simply because they leave the home, or close the office door, 
in order to work.274 Without the sentimental cloaks and aura of natural 
inevitability that state-sponsored marriage offers, the toil of caregiving 
would be harder to hide.275 
6. The Lost "Vocation" of Singleness 
Throughout the past, notably in Christian communities, individuals 
have been esteemed for their choice to forgo marriage in favor of a 
conscientious single life.276 This tradition has not entirely disappeared 
in the contemporary United States, but its erosion has accompanied 
the rise of law as central to marriage. When marriage became pre­
dominately a law-based institution, alternative versions of marriage 
once prevalent (ecclesiastical marriage, informal marriage) were dis­
placed. The unmarried condition is now extralegal, if not 'unlawful' or 
'outlawed';277 a decline in singleness as vocation or affirmative choice 
has accompanied the solidification of state-sponsored marriage. Indi­
viduals today remain free to divorce or postpone marriage, but in con-
272. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, 
CONSCIOUS-NESS, AND THE PoLmcs OF EMPOWERMENT 74 (1990). 
273. See Froma Harrop, Trapped in Rhetoric: Hypocrites Bash 'Welfare Mothers,' 
PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 2, 2002, at E9 (arguing that the desire to attack women who receive 
welfare is itself a "welfare dependency"). See Barbara Ehrenreich, Chamber of Welfare Re­
form, PROGRESSIVE, May 2002, at 14, for a discussion of the conjunction of the two canards 
about emasculation and welfare. Ehrenreich criticizes antiwelfare reformers as believing that 
welfare cuckolds black men, "usurping their rightful place as breadwinners," leaving them 
emasculated and demoralized." Id. at 14. 
274. See generally Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375 
(1996) (analyzing the "selfishness" construct). 
275. See generally Amy L. Wax, Caring Enough: Sex Roles, Work and Taxing Women, 
44 VILL. L. REV. 495, 523 (1999) (evaluating these detriments in economic terms). 
276. See ELIZABETH GROSZ, SEXUAL SUBVERSIONS 133 (1989) (claiming that chastity 
or "frigidity," as Freud termed it, meaning "the refusal of a specifically genital and orgasmic 
sexual pleasure," takes a stance against "the patriarchal requirements of heterosexuality" 
(emphasis omitted)); THE SINGLE WOMAN: COMMENTS FROM A CHRISTIAN STANDPOINT 
(Elizabeth Mitting ed., 1966) (considering singleness as a conscientious path for women). For 
praise of the singleness vocation that includes men as well as women, see AL Hsu, THE 
SINGLE ISSUE 35 (1997), and RODNEY CLAPP, FAMILIES AT THE CROSSROADS 89-113 
(1993). The latter work argues that single people are more whole than married ones. Id. 
277. These adjectives are offered figuratively, but unmarried persons do complain about 
stigma. See Miller, supra note 116 (chastising single women for believing they are entitled to 
public validation and support for their lifestyle); supra text accompanying notes 221-223. 
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temporary American culture such decisions look like rejections or ab­
stentions, no longer expressions of a contrary conviction. 
Disfavoring unmarried adults and favoring married ones, Ameri­
can law diverts individuals from endeavors that demand protracted 
isolation, childlessness, sacrifice of sexual gratification, the space to 
think quietly, or obedience to extrafamilial authority. Few such en­
deavors enjoy much popularity today, and it is hard for moderns to 
mourn their decline. The lost vocation of singleness, however, at one 
time bestowed freedoms and opportunities on a respected minority. 
The state's privileging of marriage and only marriage has not neces­
sarily endowed Americans with virtues opposite those of isolation and 
contemplation. As Linda McClain has argued, one key purpose of 
marriage in liberal democracy might be its power to train young citi­
zens in the negotiations that not only characterize intimate life, but 
also provide a base from which to explore civic negotiations. In prac­
tice, however, marriage as a legal institution has not demonstrated its 
ability to advance this training.278 The lost vocation of singleness, then, 
may not have been offset by gains.279 
7. Lost Privacy 
Claudia Card claims that marriage strips and exposes: 
Central to the idea of marriage, historically, has been intimate access to 
the persons, belongings, activities, even histories of one another. More 
important than sexual access, marriage gives spouses physical access to 
each other's residences and belongings, and it gives access to information 
about each other, including financial status, that other friends and cer­
tainly the neighbors do not ordinarily have.280 
Other writers also identify a loss of privacy that accompanies mar­
riage.281 This loss does not mean anything so specific as bathroom 
doors that get opened without knocking, but rather a sense that the 
retreats of one's life have been breached.282 Veiling the marriage itself 
in law-bound privacy compounds the disquiet, according to Card: 
278. See Linda C. McClain, What Price for Marriage (E)quality in Marriage Promotion? 
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
279. I thank John Witte for broaching this line of thought. 
280. Claudia Card, Against Marriage and Motherhood, 11 HYPATIA 1, 13 (1996) . 
281. Retail magnate Stanley Marcus published an essay noting that "marriage brings 
with it a loss of privacy to both sides, a quality most of us need, in various degrees." Stanley 
Marcus, Separation Can Be Healthy for Marriage, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 5, 1994, at 
9A (discussing earlier journalism exploring this theme). 
282. See ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 
84-85 (1988) (quoting nineteenth-century feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman as saying that 
marital privacy comes at the expense of a wife's privacy and that the wife's retreats are "re­
sented," or at least "regretted," by other members of the family). 
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For all that has been said about the privacy that marriage protects, what 
astonishes me is how much privacy one gives up in marrying. This mutual 
access appears to be a central point of marrying. Is it wise to abdicate le­
gally one's privacy to that extent? What interests does it serve? Anyone 
who in fact cohabits with another may seem to give up similar privacy. 
Yet, without marriage, it is possible to take one's life back without en­
countering the law as an obstacle.283 
When commentators, using a more upbeat rhetoric for the same 
concept, speak of the "merger" or "oneness" that melts the walls of 
privacy between spouses,284 they demonstrate that, like the offsets­
versus-detriments juxtaposition considered in connection with primary 
and secondary detriments,285 "lost privacy" and "merger" illustrate two 
sides, the good and the bad, found in marriage. Yet a crucial difference 
emerges: whereas many primary and secondary detriments can be 
abandoned and then reacquired, privacy once foregone in marriage is 
hard to regain. Divorced individuals report a preoccupation with the 
intimate content of their former marriages;286 the intimacy echoes after 
it ceases to be shared and, as Card remarks, the law entrenches con­
tinued sharing. Inside violent marriages, privacy builds a locus of 
physical conflict. The rage that fuels batterers when their wives try to 
leave, well-documented in domestic violence research,287 can be seen 
as a struggle over privacy. When she leaves her home, a battered 
woman pulls aside the marital curtains; to the batterer whom she 
abandons, this airing is violent, cold, and disruptive. What the couple 
shared - financial information, responsibility for both battering and 
non-battering intimate encounters - does not dissipate but lingers, 
mocking the idea of marital privacy as a source of gain. 
283. Card, supra note 280, at 13. 
284. See Gerry Hostetler, He Was Full of the Best Medicine, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, 
Apr. 6, 2002, at 2B (describing, in an obituary, a man's marriage as a "merger"); Kerry 
Sharp, Letter to the Editor, Strong Families Key to Prosperity, EVENING STANDARD 
(Palmerston North, New Zealand), June 15, 2001, at 4 ("Marriage is essentially about 
oneness."). 
285. See supra Parts IIl.A.4, III.B.4. 
286. Here I rely mainly on conversations I have had with divorced persons, but scholarly 
writings also support the point. See, e.g. , Nannette Diacovo, Note and Comment, California's 
Anti-Stalking Statute: Deterrent or False Sense of Security?, 24 SW. U. L. REV. 389, 397 n.64 
(1995) (noting that one survey found that "simple obsessionals, such as an ex-husband/wife" 
amounted to half the stalking caseload of the Los Angeles police); J. Herbie DiFonzo, Coer­
cive Conciliation: Judge Paul W. Alexander and the Movement for Therapeutic Divorce, 25 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 535, 555-56 (1994) (discussing professionals' perceptions of divorcing individu­
als as obsessive). 
287. See NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATIER WOMEN 36-39 
(1998) (discussing some batterers' anxiety over abandonment); cf Victoria Nourse, Passion's 
Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331,  1345-47 
(1997) (noting that a man who kills his wife or partner can frequently gain a manslaughter 
rather than a murder charge when he claims as "provocation" the woman's plan or desire to 
leave). 
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Although American law has retreated far from coverture and rec­
ognizes individual identity within marriage much more than it did even 
a few decades ago,288 marriage still blurs the identity of individuals 
when they are violators of the law or victims of that violation. In this 
sense marriage creates a partial void in civil and criminal law enforce­
ment, a space for wrongdoers to get away with what the state would 
elsewhere remedy, punish, and deter. This detriment can be classified 
as tertiary because even though law plays a direct role in these excep­
tions and immunities, many of them are unwritten or informal, a ques­
tion of norms. Police manuals, for instance, seldom instruct officers to 
take domestic violence less seriously than violence between strang­
ers.2s9 
In the zone of partial lawlessness that marriage establishes, rape 
becomes marital rape, often treated more leniently than other kinds of 
rape.290 A person can lose a jointly owned possession to forfeiture 
without any due process reclamation rights even when she has done 
nothing wrong, merely because she is married to a wrongdoer;291 tort­
feasors can, in some states, escape civil responsibility for the harms 
they do their husbands or wives;292 spouses can refuse to support de-
288. In 1981, the Supreme Court invalidated a Louisiana statute, the last such Jaw in the 
United States, that named the husband the "head and master" of the marital community. See 
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981). In earlier times, this designation was com­
mon. WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY § 113 (2d ed. 1971). Vestiges of coverture remain in mid-century case Jaw. See 
Samuel v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1 1 19, 1 130-34 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (striking down a 
university rule that assigned wives their husbands' domicile to determine their tuition); 
Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 222-23 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (holding that an Alabama Jaw 
requiring a wife to use her husband's surname was not unconstitutional). 
289. Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699-701 (9th Cir. 1999) (challeng­
ing informal classification of domestic violence 911 calls as less important). The relation 
between marriage and domestic violence is murky. Married women report Jess domestic 
violence than unmarried women, but they may simply be underreporting it. See Popenoe, 
The Top Ten Myths of Marriage, supra note 234, at 'lI 7. Women are especially likely to be 
battered in the setting of unmarried cohabitation, a fact that might commend marriage. Id. 
Alternatively, the existence of state-sponsored marriage might encourage a batterer to view 
the woman he Jives with as subordinate to him. 
290. See 2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.1, at 345 cmt.8 (rev. ed. 
1980) (urging that the Jaw of rape not "thrust the prospect of criminal sanctions into the 
ongoing process of adjustment in the marital relationship"). 
291 .  Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 447-49 (1996). Bennis leaves open the question of 
what rights an innocent co-owner would have if he or she were not married to the wrong­
doer. Id. It would be reasonable to suppose, however, that married people are particularly 
likely to own forfeitable property jointly. 
292. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-8 (1999) (retaining immunity unless marriage has broken 
down); Lucero v. Valdez, 884 P.2d 199, 201-05 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that Utah has 
not fully abrogated immunity); Williams v. Williams, 439 N.E.2d 1055, 1056-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1982); Cloud v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 440 So. 2d 961, 962 n.1 (La. Ct. App. 
1983); Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 431 N.E.2d 998, 998-99 (Ohio 1982). 
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pendent spouses with a decent minimum of comfort in relation to what 
they can afford, even though divorce would make these obligations 
enforceable.293 Parents who if divorced would be ordered to pay col­
lege tuition for their children can deny any such obligation and get 
away with it.294 From this lawless center, norms resembling the slogan 
of Might Makes Right govern private lives. Justice can become merely 
"the interest of the stronger"295 inside marriage, while elsewhere the 
rule of law hampers the same kind of abuse. 
IV. REVISING THE "CASE" 
This Part seeks to build a narrow argument. It begins by sketching 
what any case for marriage can and cannot achieve. Next it considers 
two existing def ens es of marriage, both less comprehensive than the 
failed utilitarian case. Unpersuaded by the reasoning of these two ar­
guments, I nevertheless praise them for their cogency and parsimony. 
Continuing in the direction of ever-more-parsimonious rationales to 
support this institution, I conclude that although a thick or robust de­
fense of state-sponsored marriage cannot be sustained, a thinner one 
emerges. 
A. What State-Sponsored Marriage Can Do 
"State interference is an evil," wrote Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
"where it cannot be shown to be a good."296 Although American law at 
times applies coercion to individuals without an accompanying ration­
ale about welfare, such instances are exceptions within a larger scheme 
rooted in public reason and ought to be challenged. Law constrains, 
but it should not do so without a good reason, one that is intelligible to 
interested and disinterested persons alike.297 This starting point about 
a good rationale, more conservative than the "harm principle" associ­
ated with John Stuart Mill and also more informative than such catch­
phrases as "substantive due process" and "fundamental rights," helps 
to explain why it might be a good idea for the state to sponsor mar­
riage: marriage could increase welfare. 
293. McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953). 
294. See Bix, supra note 1 10, at 12 & n.55. 
295. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 35-36 (Richard w. Sterling & William c. Scott trans., W.W. 
Norton & Co. 1985) (attributing this concept to Thrasymachus). 
296. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 77 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
Harv. Univ. Press 1963) (1881). 
297. I elaborate in Anita Bernstein, The Representational Dialectic (With Illustrations 
from Obscenity, Forfeiture, and Accident Law), 87 CAL. L. REV. 305, 364-68 (1999). 
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Wrongheaded considerations about welfare, however, continue to 
clutter public discourse. We have already considered in detail the 
sinking "case for marriage,'' which asserts that individuals should 
choose marriage because of the institution's supposed payoffs. Al­
though the data commend marrying rather than remaining unmarried 
(at least for most people), marriage partisans have not contemplated 
seriously a world without state-sponsored marriage. Their arguments 
in favor of marriage thus apply only, and at most, to the question of 
whether an individual should marry in a society where marriage exists 
and bestows benefits upon those who choose to wed; they do not re­
fute the claim that marriage should be abolished. 
1 .  The Public-Reason Constraint · 
Whereas the case-for-marriage argument fails because it is incom­
plete, other arguments fail because they are too particular. A public­
reason justification for retaining marriage must lie within reach of all 
citizens to discover and debate as human beings, rather than as mem­
bers of a subgroup.298 Accordingly, religious rationales for continuing 
marriage do not shed light on what the state should do. Even if we put 
aside First Amendment obstacles to these rationales, no single religion 
unites all Americans in the sense that they are united by shared rea­
son.299 Family-values traditionalism and conservative references to the 
past - "it must be this way because it has always been this way" -
fall short on the same ground of too much particularity.300 We are not 
all social conservatives. Not everybody embraces "family values." 
If marriage is to survive as one of a dwindling number of compre­
hensive statuses that the law continues to respect, then it must pay at­
tention to the dignity and autonomy of the individual, a concern that 
militates against status in general. Every status is inherently illiberal, 
but even illiberal categories or tendencies in the American legal sys­
tem must recognize that the individual is fundamental. Getting mar­
ried, then, must result in keeping some freedoms alive even if it must 
also extinguish others. Exit is the most fundamental of these freedoms: 
298. See Rauch, supra note 109, passim (insisting on a clear and "secular" civic under­
standing of marriage).  
299. One might mention again that religious rites would be unaffected by the abolition 
of state-sponsored marriage. 
300. Some disagree. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2495 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissent­
ing) (concluding that if longstanding tradition supports "morals legislation," such support 
should suffice to protect it from being overturned); L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law 
Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Same-Sex "Marriage": How Will Courts Enforce the Public 
Policy Exception?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 36 (1998) ("I persist in believing that a well­
grounded distaste for particular conduct that is viewed as morally objectionable by a major­
ity within a democratic society . . .  is not a product of unreasoned fear . . .  but rather of 
proper moral reservation."). 
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individuals not otherwise disabled must have the prerogative to go 
from unmarried to married and from married to unmarried. Beyond 
the prerogative of exit, a liberal version of marriage must tread cau­
tiously on the expressed preferences and life plans of individuals. 
2. Gender Equity: A Conservative Approach 
Many people committed to liberality take a stance against the sub­
ordination of women in marriage and in favor of making marriage 
available to same-sex couples. I share these inclinations but do not 
press them strongly in a case for marriage that aspires to be thin. Like 
religious understandings of marriage and family-values beliefs, a 
commitment to diminishing the force of gender in marriage - that is, 
a stance against constraints on women's freedom and the current 
opposite-sex criterion of access to the status - is still something of a 
particularistic stance. To many, the principles against subordination of 
women in marriage and in favor of access to marriage for same-sex 
couples are just as self-evident and as easy and as amenable to public 
reason, as the stance against old miscegenation laws that prohibited 
individuals of different races from marrying each other.301 This per­
spective has not yet gained recognition in the law.302 
It is possible, however, to advocate liberality with respect to gender 
in conservative terms - as an inclination, rather than a source of yes­
no rules. Because the constraint of public reason prohibits the state 
from coercing individuals unless there is a good reason to do so, the 
state should not craft its law of marriage to force individuals into a 
gender script - for instance, decreeing that a man may marry only a 
woman and a woman may marry only a man, or that a husband rather 
than a wife has the prerogative to choose the couple's place of resi­
dence - unless there is a good reason to impose this script on persons 
who will find it coercive. This position, unlike the stronger stance that 
views the law of marriage as illegitimate until it comes to comply with 
gender equity, has won influence in American law. While gender eq­
uity remains contested in public discussion in a way that race equity 
does not, it enjoys wide support and continues to make gains in public 
discourse. Accordingly, the stance I advocate here emphasizes proce­
dure rather than substance: The law of marriage should respect and 
bear in mind the claims that feminists and same-sex activists have 
made regarding marriage, without necessarily acceding to all of them. 
301 .  Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 235-36 (1994) (advancing miscegenation analogy). 
302. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483-84 (2003) (quoting Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (invoking miscegenation 
analogy)). 
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3. The Business Analogy 
Recent scholarly initiatives explore the connection between the 
law of marriage and the only other field in contemporary American 
law that continues to emphasize status as a full-throttle complement to 
contract: the law of business.303 As Martha Ertman has elaborated, 
partnerships, corporations, and limited liability companies provide 
examples of status-based constraints on freedom that override con­
tracts and other instances of individual choice, just as marriage does, 
but rely on "functionalist reasoning" rather than the "moral judg­
ment" and "purportedly natural differences" so central to family 
law.304 In a world in which apolitical objectivity has been deemed unat­
tainable, business law comes closer than any. other subject to giving 
marriage law an ideal of neutrality to emulate. 
Persons who engage in entrepreneurial commercial activity find 
that ideology does not fetter their behavior much. Businesses typically 
pursue profit, but they need not do so.305 Business law relies on the 
construct of markets, a tendency that some deem ideological; but mar­
ket rhetoric can be kept separate from the gender script that attributes 
oppressive conditions to nature or divine design, and helps to build a 
contrary ideal of nonintervention, which in turn can augment freedom 
for individuals.306 Professor Ertman invokes the numerous parallels 
between the law of marriage and the law of close corporations to ar­
gue that corporate law provides a model for a morally neutral revision 
of state-sponsored marriage.307 Professor Case builds a related analogy 
between the law of corporate bankruptcy and the law of divorce, ar­
guing that both commend a "fresh start" and a focus on putting assets 
303. Professors Mary Anne Case and Paul Mahoney formed a project called "The Role 
of the State in Marriage and Corporations," following what Case describes as a quarter cen­
tury that saw the ascendancy of the contractual theory of the corporation. In this project 
scholars frame analogies between business and marriage. See Mary Anne Case, What Stake 
Do Heterosexual Women Have in the Same-Sex Marriage/Domestic Partnership/Civil 
Union Debates? 29 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); WEITZMAN, supra 
note 5, at 240 (noting similarities between "marriage partnerships and business partner­
ships"); Ertman, supra note 6; Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A 
Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissolution Under No-Fault, 60 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 67, 1 19-38 (1993) (propounding a partnership analogy); Margaret Sokolov, 
Marriage Contracts for Support and Services: Constitutionality Begins at Home, 49 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1 161, 1 188 (1974) (predicting that the business contracts and the marriage contracts of 
the future will resemble each other more closely); see also Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital 
Pannership Pretense and Career Assets: The Ascendancy of Self over the Marital Community, 
81 B.U. L. REV. 59, 62-63, 72 (2001) (faulting current divorce law for its infidelity to the 
quasi-business partnership ideal). 
304. Ertman, supra note 6, at 83. 
305. See id. at 90 n.59 (noting the legal recognition of nonprofit businesses). 
306. Id. at 90. 
307. Id. at 112-23. 
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to productive use, and noting that both have turned away from pinning 
stigma on failed entities.308 At least in principle, the law of marriage, 
emulating the law of business, could address the rights and interests of 
the individuals whom marriage affects, rather than rest on gender and 
other socially scripted constraints on individuals' choices. 
B .  Two Cogent Arguments in Favor of State-Sponsored Marriage 
Scholars take state-sponsored marriage for granted. Almost none 
have set out to defend it against an abolitionist proposition. In the 
large body of writings that applaud "the family," an institution consid­
ered vulnerable to feminism and individualism as well as macroeco­
nomic phenomena such as the decline of wage labor, however, one 
does find copious cheering for marriage. Among these cheers, two ar­
guments warrant particular attention. 
1.  Belonging and Shelter in a Postmodern World 
Bruce Hafen speaks of "belonging" as a necessary condition for 
human fulfillment.309 Although the idea of belonging to, or possessing, 
another person can connote enslavement or objectification, Hafen ar­
gues, "the bonds of kinship and marriage are valuable ties that 
bind."310 Hafen worries that liberal individualism has brought about a 
current "age of the waning of belonging," and defends marriage as in­
tegral to the struggle against loneliness.311 
Family law scholar Milton C. Regan, Jr. has crafted a more de­
tailed argument for the ongoing vitality of status-based family law 
within a liberal and feminist jurisprudence.312 Professor Regan aspires 
to a defense of status-based family law that, contrary to a longstanding 
tradition in the field, does not rest on children's vulnerability and de­
pendence: he aspires to explain all of family law including its childless 
aspects. As he must, Regan begins by acknowledging that status in 
family law is associated with oppression, especially oppression of 
women: "the Victorians gave status a bad name."313 Paradoxically, 
however, the constraint of status is necessary to generate the empow­
ered self that individualism upholds. 
308. Case, supra note 303, at 34. 
309. Bruce Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belong-
ing, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 31-42. 
310. Id. at 31-34. 
311. Id. at 32. 
312. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993); 
Regan, supra note 3. 
313. Regan, supra note 3, at 165. 
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Without status, Regan explains, a person bobbles from episode to 
episode without continuity of identity. The autonomous individual so 
prized in modernism and contractarian political thought is not a 
daughter, a husband, or somebody's child, hemmed in by the duties 
and commitments that these identities impose. These people are free. 
A transaction eagerly embraced today might become dull or distaste­
ful tomorrow - the individual might feel less like a son then, or more 
like a mother. To Regan this figure does not embody "the 
Enlightenment dream of individual emancipation"314 but rather is 
lonely and pitiful, worse off than he would have been without the ties 
of status. Buffeted by "the winds of each passing experience," unpro­
tected from whatever stimuli come his way, this person cannot main­
tain the sense of being "a purposive agent."315 And when one loses 
status, one loses identity and intimacy. Identity diminishes because 
only status can remind us that our past will shape and frame our pres­
ent and future. Intimate commitment becomes harder to achieve be­
cause intimacy is dependent on identity. Without a self to unite last 
year's promises with tomorrow's array of options, there is no reason to 
feel bound or even affected by an episode in the past that linked one 
person with another.316 So hampered in their pursuit of intimacy and 
identity, individuals suffer. 
In order to assuage these harsh effects, individuals need the sup­
port of marriage. The fragmenting effects of postmodern life notwith­
standing, most people seek a primary relationship as a base of roman­
tic and sexual intimacy. The quest can lead to great pain: Regan notes 
the vulnerability that derives from looking for, and also from having 
found, a partner. Just as economic vulnerability justifies regulation to 
override freedom of contract, at least in the post-Lochner era, the 
emotional vulnerability that always accompanies the romantic dyad 
means that law should sponsor a status of marriage Regan argues, in 
order to affirm responsibilities that derive from dependence and mu­
tual vulnerability.317 
314. Id. at 162. 
315. See id. at 164. 
316. Id. at 170. 
317. Id. at 168. In an effort to move marriage from status to contract, one might consider 
the possibility of enhancing marital stability within a body of marital "contract" law encom­
passing harsh penalties for breach. Such a doctrine could adopt some principles of current 
contract law, for example by allowing parties to collect for divorce-related economic loss or 
to pre-set difficult-to-calculate liquidated damages, much as prenuptual agreements cur­
rently allow. Marital "contract" law might build on these traditional principles, also allowing 
parties to collect, for example, damages for emotional trauma. The additional stability, how­
ever, could come at a substantial cost: it might undermine our no-fault divorce system, force 
persons unable to pay damages to stay in decaying marriages, and result in unconstitutional 
discrimination against the poor, who would face limitations on their fundamental right to 
divorce. 
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Could marriage, for Regan, exist without state sponsorship? Regan 
says little about the legal consequences of marital status in a harmoni­
ous or otherwise ongoing marriage. Regarding divorce, however, 
Regan finds doctrinal applications,318 suggesting to readers that his 
conception of status has state-sponsored marriage in mind, rather than 
an informal status relation like the boyfriend-girlfriend dyad in con­
temporary society or a pair united only by contract in the hypothetical 
future world, after state-sponsored marriage is abolished. At a mini­
mum Regan appears to insist on retaining the legal category of "fam­
ily," where individuals are constrained at least by social norms, if not 
legal rules, from doing whatever they please. He notes with disap­
proval the academic perception that "the family" is just one variant on 
"the close relationship situation. "319 
This vagueness on what "family" means mars an otherwise elegant 
argument and suggests that Regan's thesis does not complete the task 
of defending the existence of state-sponsored marriage. If all we need 
is any status label, however inconsequential to the law, in order to find 
refuge from postmodern clangor, then "partner" and "lover" would 
serve as well as "husband" and "wife."  If, alternatively, Regan intends 
for marriage to be a status with significant law-based constraints, then 
he needs to explain how to balance individualism against respect for 
status in one's everyday life - that is to say, as a participant in one's 
own marriage - and family law. Regan purports to endorse two con­
trary values. He commends sensitivity to "the solitary and the social 
dimension of our being" but also urges "an equilibrium in which both 
status and contract play a role."320 At this high level of generality, all 
answers to tough questions become possible, and the defense of state­
sponsored marriage crumbles. 
2. The Savage Hypothesis 
From an array of disciplines and perspectives - feminism notably 
excluded - some scholars applaud marriage for its effects in socializ­
ing men: half the human race, they say, has brutish inclinations that 
society must moderate. In 1986, before the fathers' and marriage 
movements got underway, George Gilder offered a book-length expo-
318. See id. at 171-74 (contending that parties to a divorce should have the option of 
bringing fault into the adjudication); id. at 174-78 (arguing against "the clean break" ap­
proach to property division, favoring instead an effort to leave husband and wife with an 
equal standard of living, particularly if the marriage was long). The former suggestion is 
critiqued in Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, 
and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719, 724-37. 
319. Regan, supra note 3, at 162. 
320. Id. at 174. 
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sition of this argument.321 Men and Marriage begins with a claim that 
civilization is what human beings achieve when the long-term timeta­
ble and sense of futurity inherent in female sexuality overpower male 
sexual impulses: 
In creating civilization, women transform male lust into love; channel 
male wanderlust into jobs, homes, and families; link men to specific chil­
dren; rear children into citizens; change hunters into fathers; divert male 
will to power into a drive to create. Women conceive the future that men 
tend to flee; they feed the children that men ignore.322 
As Gilder sees the sexes, women enjoy a unique serenity because 
of the capacities they find in their bodies. They are capable of diverse 
sexual acts and experiences, whereas men have only two meager ones, 
erection and ejaculation: "Nothing about the male body dictates any 
specific pattern beyond a repetitive release of sexual tension. "323 
Whether she bears children or not, each woman knows that she can 
"perform the only act that gives sex an unquestionable meaning, an 
incarnate result. "324 Contrast her tragic" fellow human being: 
For men the desire for sex is not simply a quest for pleasure. It is an in­
dispensable test of identity. And in itself it is always ultimately temporary 
and inadequate. Unless his maleness is confirmed by his culture, he must 
enact it repeatedly, and perhaps destructively for himself or his soci­
ety . . . .  A man without a woman has a deep inner sense of dispensability, 
perhaps evolved during the millennia of service in the front lines of tribal 
defense. He is sexually optional.325 
The consequences to society are clear. Impulsive, trapped in the 
present, more cut off physically from nurturing and consequently from 
caring about human beings - cut off even from valuing his own life -
this person is not only uncivilized but an active menace to civilized 
321. GEORGE GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE (1986). 
322. Id. at 5 .  
323. Id. at 8-9. 
324. Id. at 9. 
325. Id. at 11 ,  15; see also DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, VIOLENT LAND: SINGLE MEN AND 
SOCIAL DISORDER FROM THE FRONTIER TO THE INNER CITY (1996); David Popenoe, Life 
Without Father, in LOST FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA 33, 36 
(Cynthia R. Daniels ed., 1998) ("Left culturally unregulated, men's sexual behavior can be 
promiscuous, their paternity casual, their commitment to families weak.") [hereinafter 
Popenoe, Life Without Father]. The prevalence of longterm gay male dyads might refute this 
rather stereotypical depiction. Writers debate whether homosexually inclined men desire or 
embrace marriage-like monogamous relationships. Compare George W. Dent, Jr., The 
Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581, 642-43 (1999) (quoting WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 83 (1996) (commenting that gay men 
eschew "quasi-marriages")), with Letitia Anne Peplau, Lesbian and Gay Relationships, in 
HOMOSEXUALITY 177, 179-81 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991) (finding 
a similar desire among opposite-sex and same-sex couples, including men and women, for a 
long, enduring relationship, and noting the endurance of very long-lived pairings among gay 
men and women). 
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people. Young single men, writes David Popenoe, "make up the ma­
jority of deviants, delinquents, criminals, killers, drug users, vice lords, 
and miscreants of every kind."326 Compared to married men, single 
men drink almost twice as much; they are also more likely to have 
drinking problems, to drink and drive, and to get into fights.327 Al­
though they constitute about thirteen percent of the population over 
age fourteen, they commit nearly ninety percent of major and violent 
crimes.328 "Groups of sociologists venturing into urban streets after 
their seminars on violence in America do not rush to their taxis fearing 
attack by marauding bands of feminists, covens of single women, or 
angry packs of welfare mothers," writes Gilder. "[O]ne need have lit­
tle fear of any group that so much as contains women - or, if the truth 
be known, of any group that contains men who are married to 
women."329 Another writer claims that men, who "constitute the ma­
jority, and the most productive portion, of the workforce" would have 
less incentive to work hard if marriage were abolished - and none 
whatsoever, if Martha Fineman were to succeed in having government 
pay women to care for their children at the same rate that marriage 
now compensates them.330 In this perspective, marriage rescues not 
only a man, who would be lonely and worth little otherwise, but the 
society around him. 
Other writings have advanced the thesis that this bleakness is repli­
cated in a second generation: they associate being deprived of a father 
in one's home with deviant or antisocial behavior. The sons of ab­
sconded scoundrels are the chief offenders, but writers worry also 
about daughters, more vulnerable to teen pregnancy and out-of­
wedlock childbearing when their parents are separated or divorced.331 
A correlation between fatherlessness and troubled children is widely 
accepted.332 In sum, here in the savage hypothesis men must marry 
326. Popenoe, Life Without Father, supra note 325, at 43. 
327. Waite, supra note 1 17, at 15-16. 
328. GILDER, supra note 321, at 65; see also Scott J. South & Steven F. Messner, Crime 
and Demography: Multiple Linkages, Reciprocal Relations, 26 ANN. REV. Soc. 83, 86 (2000) 
(reviewing evidence that marriage seems to reduce a man's propensity for crime). Married 
men are, however, well-represented in the ranks of white-collar criminals. Edward Helmore, 
Want to Survive in the Slammer? Then Feign Paranoia. Don't Stare. And Take Pyjamas, 
OBSERVER, Jul. 6, 1997, at 17 (reporting on the enterprise of "con consultants" who give tips 
to clients, most of whom are "white, middle-aged, married men involved in white-collar 
crime," about how to get through their prison sentences, and claiming that this business is "a 
winner" because of increases in white-collar crime). 
329. GILDER, supra note 321, at 64-65. 
330. Lloyd R. Cohen, Rhetoric, The Unnatural Family, and Women's Work, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 2275, 2289 (1995). 
331. See Popenoe, Life Without Father, supra note 325, at 41-43. 
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and stay married - because if they don't, they will take us all down 
with them.333 
C. Toward a Third Way: Marriage Reenvisioned 
At this point we have aired the principal arguments for state­
sponsored marriage, classifying them as either not cogent or cogent. 
Much of the utilitarian "case for marriage" - marriage is good be­
cause it makes people healthy, wealthy, and happy - reduces to tau­
tology.334 Moreover, it collapses when its unstated beliefs, chief among 
them the notion that state-sponsored marriage can never be elimi­
nated, fail to support its weight. The utilitarian "case for marriage" is 
not cogent. 
The last two arguments, however, follow a sturdy inner logic. 
Having ably contended that an individual needs some kind of status 
role in order to achieve intimacy and identity, Milton Regan is able to 
portray marriage as tending to ease the existential sadness that comes 
from relating to other persons only through one's bargains and epi­
sodic encounters.335 The savage hypothesis is cogent too. If one posits 
that men are inherently different from women, and that the ways in 
which they differ from women conduce to social instability and havoc, 
then the highly gendered institution of marriage becomes a way to 
cabin men, reducing the social harm they would otherwise cause. One 
need not agree with either argument in order to agree that both make 
sense on their own terms, in a way that the utilitarian "case for mar­
riage" does not. 
Mere cogency, however, cannot justify engraving an argument into 
public policy. Premises must be questioned, and then rejected if they 
prove wrong. The conclusion of wrongness can derive from varied 
commitments. For example, it would be wrong not to lower the speed 
332. But see Judith Stacey, Dada-ism in the 1990s: Getting Past Baby Talk About Fa­
therlessness, in LOST FATHERS, supra note 325, at 51, 64 (noting that social science has not 
settled on a definition of "fatherlessness" and so cannot identify what it causes, if anything). 
As will be familiar by now, other variables, especially money, are also significant: losing a 
father means losing some of the income he would otherwise have contributed, and poverty is 
also correlated with antisocial behavior. Wade C. Mackey & Nancy S. Coney, The Enigma of 
Father Presence in Relationship to Sons' Violence and Daughters' Mating Strategies: Empiri­
cism in Search of a Theory, 8 J. MEN'S STUD. 349 (2000) (citing sources). 
333. It is odd that such high-pitched apocalyptic phobia, casting the masculine nature as 
antithetical to civilization, comes almost exclusively from conservative men. As feminist 
scholar Drucilla Cornell has remarked, few women, "even in their worst fantasies and fears," 
hold so bleak and negative a view of what men offer the world. Drucilla Cornell, Fatherhood 
and Its Discontents: Men, Patriarchy, and Freedom, in LOST FATHERS, supra note 325, at 183, 
183. This discourse also eliminates nonheterosexual men from its consideration. 
334. See supra Part 11.C. 
335. See supra notes 313-318 and accompanying text. 
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limit on a highway just before a sharp curve, because principles related 
to automobile braking and deceleration make unreduced, pre-curve 
speeds dangerous. Such principles appear to be, and I would say really 
are, prepolitical and nonideological. 
While the "belonging" argument of Hafen and Regan contains no 
a priori affronts of this kind, the savage hypothesis is at best indeter­
minate as a matter of descriptive fact, the reality that lawmakers need 
to consider in such contexts as setting highway speed limits. One might 
say that descriptive fact, however politically incorrect or inconvenient, 
must always outweigh even the best-intentioned attempts to revise the 
truth. Perhaps. Yet the question of how inherently different men and 
women are from each other - before politics, before ideology, before 
even their birth as persons - cannot be measured in a setting so per­
meated with socially installed and enforced gender roles as the con­
temporary United States. Adequate laboratory conditions for such a 
study are not present; we do not have the data needed to support a 
hypothesis that men inherently demand extra measures of socializa­
tion. The farrago of proclamations from journalists and some social 
scientists that male and female human beings are fundamentally more 
different than alike - based on leaps of faith, tiny samples, tenden­
tious inferences from ambiguous data, ideological readings of what 
anthropologists report, and the disregard of contrary evidence -
proves only that strong versions of gender dimorphism have a big fol­
lowing in both the media and the academy,336 not that conjectures 
about that dimorphism are true or false. And so, forced to proceed 
without guidance from social science, policymakers must rely on 
American political and jurisprudential commitments. 
Whether true or false or something in between, the savage hy­
pothesis affronts several distinct precepts of American law and law­
making. Its claim that legal rules and institutions should regard men as 
brutes dishonors the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
which limits the effect that government can give to gender-based 
stereotypes.337 Its sweeping denigration of millions of people offends 
procedural justice.338 If engraved into legal doctrine and public policy 
it would, or should, hurt the "hearts and minds" of men and boys so 
insulted.339 Its dismissal of the passage of time and the accretion of cul-
336. See Bernstein, supra note 175, at 36-40 (citations omitted). 
337. Some late twentieth-century Supreme Court case law can be read in this light. See, 
e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) (striking down sex segregation as 
practiced in a state military academy); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-36 (1996) (invali­
dating a state law that took an antagonistic stance toward homosexually inclined persons). 
338. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (arguing that an inclination toward procedural justice, ex­
tending beyond the legal system, is rooted in human psychology). 
339. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
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ture - evolutionary psychology sees human nature as fixed in the sa­
vanna of the Stone Age - expresses a posture hostile to negotiation 
and political compromise, one that the Supreme Court has held to in­
validate numerous laws.340 Its portrait of the male human being as de­
structive, sociopathic, and an enemy of order is at odds with such 
foundational documents as the Declaration of Independence and the 
Bill of Rights, which recognize the citizen's capacity for thought, 
speech, religious belief, association and assembly, giving and receiving 
counsel, and civic participation. 
Although American lawmakers and policymakers are thus pre­
cluded from using the savage hypothesis as a condemnation, or even a 
reductive summary, of male humanity, they can share some of the val­
ues that happen to animate Men and Marriage and other expressions 
of the hypothesis - those beliefs that do not affront equal protection, 
procedural justice, and civic governance. Classifying men as savages is 
categorically wrong. A concern for civil society and sociopolitical sta­
bility, however, is laudable. 
From these two cogent arguments favoring state-sponsored mar­
riage, then, we can see the outlines of a newer case for marriage, one 
that escapes both the vagueness of Regan's indeterminate endorse­
ment of status on the one hand, and the gender shackles of the savage 
hypothesis on the other. The cogent arguments take a crucial step for­
ward in defending marriage. Although marriage has let many people 
down, made them worse off, and caused harm to society, its ideals and 
practices offer genuine goods.341 In benefiting individuals it can benefit 
third parties and the larger society as well. 
Marriage holds the potential of giving individuals more of a past 
and a future than they would otherwise have. When they marry, espe­
cially if they are relatively young at the time, couples convincingly re­
port a feeling of connection to their ancestors, progenitor couples who 
entered unions of their own, while looking ahead.342 Past and future 
are partner concepts, not opposites. As Robert Nisbet and other 
scholars of progressivism have detailed, a sense of the past makes a 
340. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 386-87 (1964) (invalidating a vote-dilution scheme); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding that vote-dilution cases are justiciable in 
federal court); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (identi­
fying the need for judges to look out for "discrete and insular minorities" as political actors). 
The rise of voting-rights jurisprudence rests on a premise that human beings are injured 
when they are deprived of meaningful political participation. See Pamela S. Karlan, The 
Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1705, 1709-33 (1993) 
(conceptualizing the right to vote in broad categories: participation, aggregation, and gov­
ernance). 
341. See Witte, supra note 38 (noting "goods" of marriage). 
342. Sarah Blustain, Counterproposal, LILITH, Spring 2000, at 17, available at 
http://www.poppolitics.com/articles/2000-06-19-counterproposal.shtml. 
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sense of the future possible and coherent.343 Neither human beings nor 
societies can flourish without a prevailing belief that the future holds 
some meanings and consequences for them.344 As a form of enforced 
commitment, state-sponsored marriage facilitates investment - that 
is, the sacrifice of short-term gain for the prospect of returns in the 
long term - just as other state-sponsored enforced commitments, like 
procedural rules and the protection of property holdings, facilitate 
economic investment. 
To opponents of marriage, these values will sound ominous: a critic 
can hear the clink and rattle of chains. This critic might start by saying 
that even if marrying does give individuals a sense of connection to the 
past, other avenues toward this connection might work better. Perhaps 
marriage has obstructed their development. Moreover, Regan's ele­
gant admonition that individual human fulfillment cannot emerge 
without the status roles that build a sense of self and permit intimate 
connection to another person notwithstanding, this idealized version 
of marriage - as shelter, continuity, investment base, buffer against 
impulses and seductive opportunities - overlooks much oppression 
inherent in the institution. The legal category of marriage has begotten 
a generation of pernicious newer categories: marital rape (and the 
Model Penal Code's "spousal exemption" to rape), family immunity 
from tort liability, tax rules that encourage husbands to make money 
and avoid their families while discouraging wives from earning wages, 
"bastardy" and "legitimacy" to describe the status of children, de­
fense-of-marriage state laws that do nothing except denigrate same-sex 
unions, and numerous other hurtful concepts.345 I deny none of these 
harmful effects of state-sponsored marriage, and indeed have gone to 
some trouble to catalogue and recite them. But this re-accounting 
finds gain as well as loss: the "case" for state-sponsored marriage ne­
glects a crucial point. 
The point may be seen as the political and communal counterpart 
to Regan's postmodernist psychology, which focuses on marriage as a 
source of gain for individuals. To the extent he is persuasive, Regan 
redeems marriage from the perspective of a solitary person who seeks 
identity and intimacy, but does not link this individual's opportunity 
with a societal interest in marriage. In order to demonstrate a distinct 
societal interest in marriage one must show that letting human beings 
achieve identity and intimacy makes for a gain to the collective, such 
343. ROBERT A. NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1980); MADSEN PIRIE, 
TRIAL AND ERROR AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1978). 
344. Here Gilder and Regan explicitly agree. See also Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender 
in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1974-75 (200 ) ("[M]arriage is experienced mainly in the 
future and in the past."). 
345. See generally Card, supra note 280. 
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as better citizens or greater economic prosperity.346 It may be the case 
that because statuses always require societal recognition, Regan has 
necessarily made a political and social point as well as a psychological 
one. But the argument in favor of a status (a social construct) needs to 
show how societies gain when that status is in place.347 
If marriage and comparable statuses were to disappear, the indi­
vidual would flutter from transaction to transaction, contract to con­
tract, and encounter to encounter, Regan says, bouncing like images 
on MTV.348 What happens to society, to the body politic, as this person 
bounces? It too might be unmoored from a base of deep tradition and 
continuity. But unlike the individual, who in Regan's exposition dis­
solves and becomes lost, a society can hold itself together without 
state-sponsored marriage. Marriage as a law-based status arrived rela­
tively recently in human existence.349 Humanity can live without it. 
We arrive at the relevant question for legal policy: what would 
American society be like if the state were to withdraw from recogniz­
ing marriage, a status now derived from the romantic dyad? How 
would humanity live without it in the United States? Not by failing to 
cohere, like Regan's lost individual. Instead, some new source of 
power and governance would move into the space that marriage now 
holds. There are only two contenders for this role in governing private 
lives.350 One is the state, regulating individuals directly rather than 
346. See infra note 370 (noting arguments that the marriage movement has failed 
to make). 
347. In her classic critique of state-sponsored marriage, Lenore Weitzman takes pains to 
detail this kind of analysis. See WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 246-54 (concluding a chapter 
titled "The Case for Intimate Contracts" with a survey of the "social policy issues" that her 
proposal implicates). 
348. Regan, supra note 3, at 163. 
349. Boaz, supra note 3 (noting the relatively recent date, 1754, on which the Earl of 
Hardwick's Act gave the (secular) government authority over marriage). I thank Joan 
Mahoney for emphasizing this point. 
· 
350. Marriage scholar Steven Nock elaborates on where this power can lie, finding five 
possible locations: 
As a sociologist, I see norms as the primary source of social order and conformity. Norms, 
that is, are the building blocks of social institutions. My perspective begins by viewing any 
society as a cluster of integrated social institutions. While there may be many such institutions 
in any one society, all societies have at least five. There is always an organized system of se­
curing and distributing goods and services, or an economy. There is always some organized 
method for transmitting knowledge from one generation to the next, or an educational insti­
tution. There is always an organized pattern of protection and formal social control, or a 
state. There is always an organized system of dealing with the ultimately unknowable, or a 
religion. And there is always a patterned system to distribute the obligations for dependent 
individuals (children and the elderly), or a family. 
Nock, supra note 344, at 1972. Educational systems are not contenders for power over inti­
mate lives, and the First Amendment disqualifies religion from overt governance within 
American law (although it would undoubtedly gain power if state-sponsored marriage were 
abolished). The three other institutions remain available to govern family life. 
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through its current indirect practice of making a status out of a pairing. 
The other is the market. As they do under contemporary liberal re­
gimes around the world with respect to economics, the two would 
likely share power in a postmarriage legal regime. Moving toward the 
terrain that state-sponsored marriage now occupies, they would each 
gain the opportunity to grow stronger. 
A liberal policymaker who is willing to consider abolishing state­
sponsored marriage has good reason to proceed with caution before 
ceding new prerogatives to either the state or the market. To many 
who have contemplated the abolition of state-sponsored marriage, 
new state-sponsored initiatives - either well-framed default rules to 
be used when disputes arise within a relationship, or an array of offi­
cial legal options that couples could choose when approaching state 
registries - would necessarily follow this particular law reform.351 
Even if the state were to hold firm to its abolitionist agenda and refuse 
to recognize coupledom except in terms of what individuals choose to 
do, the result of abolition would be not one big new void in the legal 
realm, but a proliferation of new, smaller state-sponsored rules, cov­
ering the terrain that the old marriage regime once regulated more 
obliquely. The substantive content of these new state-sponsored con­
trols would not necessarily move private life in a progressive or be­
nevolent direction. 
And if the state were to pull away from regulating the romantic 
dyad altogether, allowing contracts and transactions to control this 
kind of union, then social effects would follow. Although the aboli­
tionist stance consistently disclaims any agenda to abolish the couple 
in any extralegal sense - two may merge into one in their own minds, 
say abolitionists, even as they remain two in the eyes of the law - re­
formers know from experience that when American law stops recog­
nizing a particular status, that status goes into decline in day-to-day 
life, not just in legal form.352 As the concept of an e pluribus unum 
couple gets weaker in relation to the state's abandonment of marital 
status, intimate conjunction would move toward an exchange under­
taken in the hope of individual gain, like the purchase and sale of 
goods in a market. We have seen that Regan thinks each player in this 
game is a loser, at least in relation to the alternative available through 
state-sponsored marriage. The societal perspective on this abolitionist 
picture is less bleak, but concerns emerge. 
351. For stimulating my thoughts on this subject, I thank Peter Siegelman, William 
Eskridge, and Michael Broyde, each of whom separately volunteered his belief that any 
abolition of state-sponsored marriage would install a range of new default settings, rather 
than true elimination. 
352. See supra Part 111.C (discussing the relation between a legal category like marriage 
and its "tertiary" effects, most of which are norms). 
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There is no reason to suppose that the human craving for paired 
connection would disappear with the abolition of state-sponsored mar­
riage, and so abolition would throw most people into an uncharted 
competition for intimacy. The marital bond that now holds opposite­
sex couples together (and by example encourages same-sex couples to 
think of themselves as conjoined) would loosen; pairing-off might 
grow more provisional, requiring more effort to keep up. These strug­
gles would take time away from other pursuits. It seems plausible to 
speculate that individuals who can never obtain respite from compet­
ing for intimacy would have less to offer (including, for example, 
political engagement, the building of economic wealth, the care of 
children, or expanding the frontiers of human knowledge and accom­
plishment) than those not competing in this market. To the extent that 
individuals abjure the competitive market for romantic love and 
choose isolation instead, civic realms could benefit from the energies 
of full-time participants. But one might question the goodness of social 
settings and institutions in which solitary, intimacy-barren volunteers 
living in dissent from a common pursuit hold the reins. Moreover, 
markets are notoriously severe, tending to reward powerful persons at 
the expense of weaker ones. Wealth (in men) and reproductive-age 
youth (in women) are cold commodities now; they might be pursued 
and bought and sold and liquidated even more harshly in a world in 
which men and women could not take refuge in status. 
If these concerns about direct state regulation and a triumphant 
market are valid - and their validity cannot be known, absent an 
abolitionist experiment - then state-sponsored marriage becomes a 
political force that, for all its numberless flaws, offers protections and 
benefits. Located at a kind of midpoint between the intrusions of di­
rect regulation at one end and the laissez-faire prerogatives of the 
market at the other, state-sponsored marriage presents a unique blend 
of freedom and control. And just as the experience of getting married 
connects couples with their past and their future, marriage as a social 
institution manifests both continuity and change. Memories and arche­
types of marriage occupy human consciousness: when same-sex mar­
riage activists criticize Baker v. State, the Vermont decision that used a 
common-benefits clause of the state constitution to extend the legal 
privileges of marriage to same-sex couples,353 they mean to say, among 
other things, that one of the "common benefits" withheld under 
353. See, e.g., David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call It Marriage": The First Amendment and 
Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 1020 (2001) (contending that 
Vermont's civil unions violate the First Amendment because they withhold expression from 
citizens); Michael Mello, For Today, I'm Gay: The Unfinished Battle for Same-Sex Marriage 
in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149, 156 (2000) (claiming that "political reality" stopped the 
Vermont legislature from enacting same-sex marriage and that " 'political reality' is a polite 
term for homophobia"). 
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Vermont law is a connection to symbols and traditions derived from 
marriage in the past. State-sponsored marriage feels different from the 
state-sponsored granting of marital entitlements:354 the force of mar­
riage lies in the fact that it combines legal privileges and duties with an 
extralegal, socially understood set of conventions.355 
Political philosophy and legal theory recognize the force of extra­
legal authority on individuals' lives. Although the words "norms" and 
"community" and "social meaning" and "anarchist philosophy" push 
separate buttons and engage (or affront) different advocates, these 
terms unite around their attention to intermediate institutions - buff­
ers between law and no-law - that structure human relations. Juris­
prudes of all schools acknowledge the existence of intermediate insti­
tutions as central to law in a complex society; there can be neither law 
nor society without them. For the moment at least, marriage is a cru­
cial intermediate institution. 
Readers thus far unconvinced that marriage is worth retaining 
might now consider the procedural obstacles to abolition. Even if mar­
riage as 'third way,' to reuse a hoary phrase, were discounted, and the 
market or direct state regulation preferred as a source of social con­
trol, the costs of abolishing state-sponsored marriage would be heavy, 
in several senses. No groundswell of popular feeling supports this 
change, and so marriage could be abolished only after considerable 
investment - either in fending off resistance or the slower-paced 
strategy of nurturing existing sentiments or tendencies against mar­
riage.356 This cost belongs on the ledger alongside our tripartite schema 
of the disutilities of marriage.357 
354. For this reason Mary Anne Case argues that women inclined to choose a male 
rather than a female partner have a stake in debates over civil unions and domestic partner­
ship. They might abjure marriage because of its oppressive traditions, but also want the 
"common benefits" of a state-sponsored pairing. Case, supra note 303. Case's stance com­
plements that of the same-sex marriage activists who oppose the Vermont compromise: both 
she and they identify the symbolic community that links marriage to the past, but Case repu­
diates that link, whereas the activists pursue it. Although these stances may appear opposed, 
one may readily agree with both of them. The connection of marriage to past traditions is a 
source of social progress both for same-sex couples, who enrich the meaning of marriage, 
and for heterosexual dissenters like Case, who testify to the danger of oppression while not 
obstructing others from access to marriage. 
355. Same-sex marriage may be necessary to build public recognition of lesbians and gay 
men as partners in Jong-term relationships, not just as individuals. Christine Pierce, Gay 
Marriage, J. Soc. PHIL, Fall 1995, at 5, 14 (1995). Without access to marriage, writes Pierce, 
same-sex couples look abnormal, not like "couples, partners, family, and kin." Id. at 13. 
356. See generally D.H. HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM 1 10 (1967) 
(arguing that the study of any reform proposal must take into account the conditions that the 
reform proposes to change because, without this increment, one cannot know the price of 
transition). I thank philosopher Ben Zipursky for helping me think of the much-stretched 
"utilitarianism" as including the social costs of tampering with settled, relied-upon 
marriage law. 
357. See supra Part III. 
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The transition between state recognition of marriage and no state 
recognition of marriage yields numerous complications. Other legal 
statuses, as was noted, have disappeared or dwindled in a variety of 
patterns: the accretion of state-level reforms, judicial activism, presi­
dential decree, public disapproval and desuetude.358 While most legal 
statuses that have disappeared made their exit slowly, the abolition of 
slavery provides an example of status elimination that the government 
imposed on unwilling, bellicose Americans. 
Advocates for the elimination of state-sponsored marriage can thus 
consider the frontal-assault pattern that characterized the Civil War 
and its aftermath, in addition to other precedents that got rid of 
statuses in ambiguous retreats. The most dramatic mechanism would 
be for Congress to declare every marriage null and void in the United 
States.359 Congress may not have the power to pass such a law,360 even 
if anyone would ever take such a violent prospect seriously as a plan of 
action. As an alternative, imagine years of investigation followed by 
enactment of a federal statute patterned on the Defense of Marriage 
Act: pick a day in the future and circle it on the calendar as the last 
date on which couples could enter into a marriage that the law would 
recognize. Would thousands rush to the altar? How could more than 
fifty jurisdictions, all of them with their own laws of marriage, coordi­
nate the timing of abolition? 
The abolish-marriage literature is inclined to pass over problems of 
form and procedure, which include the division between federal and 
state regulatory authority to control marriage, the role of the judiciary 
in managing the abolition of state-sponsored marriage, the possibility 
of executive-branch nonacquiescence, and the validity of legal judg­
ments or entitlements that might arise based on a mistaken belief that 
parties were married in a way that the law recognizes. One must ad­
vert briefly to these difficulties here, however, to raise just a sugges­
tion of how cumbersome it would be for the government to get out of 
358. See supra note 17. 
359. The postwar government of Italy took this step with respect to titles of nobility, by 
popular vote. Sophie Arie, Exiled Royals Dip a Toe in Italy, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 15, 
2003, at 15. 
360. See supra Part I.A (noting constitutional limitations). One might also note that the 
Tenth Amendment, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992) (invalidating 
congressional legislation that infringed upon state sovereignty), and Article I limitations on 
congressional power, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE 
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 4 (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court has 
held, in several unrelated areas of law, that Congress cannot pass laws impinging on state 
sovereignty), and the narrowing view of the Commerce Clause that the Supreme Court took 
in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-19 (2000), may prohibit Congress from invali­
dating all existing and future marriages. For an overview of these evolving limits on congres­
sional power, see Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress's Power Under the Commerce Clause: 
What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731 (2003). 
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the marriage business. Moreover, even if we assume an orderly shift 
from the current world into this future one, a large cohort would live 
in the in-between years, with some people entitled to call themselves 
"married" or needing to get "divorced" in order to "remarry," and 
others disabled altogether from the status. Strife and frustration within 
families, and among unrelated persons, would accompany the transi­
tion. 
If, by contrast, state-sponsored marriage were to remain an option 
while also receiving some of the critical attention that I have cast on it 
here, society would more likely maximize its gains. The benefits of 
marriage, whatever they really are, would continue. The detriments 
would be better understood, perhaps becoming more amenable to 
strategic minimization at the individual level (for example, couples 
could anticipate future difficulties with antenuptial contracting) and 
law reform at the aggregate (we could rewrite Social Security rules, for 
instance). With marriage no longer fulsomely and tautologically 
praised as the source of everything good but rather treated as a mixed 
blessing, individuals would enter into this relation more soberly, and 
society would regain some of the losses now written off under tenden­
tious bookkeeping. Kept alive and thus open to future gain, marriage 
could evolve into something better. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1997, when activists were beginning to achieve their first legisla­
tive successes in promoting marriage, one dissenting activist added a 
dash of rhetoric to the public mix: 
An enterprise has a fifty percent failure rate. The female participants are 
injured sixty-three percent of the time. Children in the system are physi­
cally and sexually abused from thirty to eighty percent of the time. If this 
were a business, its doors would soon be closed. If it were a workplace, 
OSHA would shut it down. If it were a school, the principal would be ar­
rested. Instead politicians extol it, courts ruminate over its value to soci­
ety, and business, religious, and cultural leaders pander to its mystique.361 
The passage is noteworthy not for its dubious statistics - the "failure 
rate" of marriage is hard to measure; the thirty-to-eighty range is so 
wide as to be meaningless; and the percentage of women "injured" by 
marriage is probably not precisely sixty-three - but as a specimen of 
the fervent discourse that altered American law at a particular time, 
and has not yet finished its work. 
361. Post, supra note 19, at 283. Post cites the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 
1995, Post, supra note 19, at 283 nn.1-3 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1995, at 346 tbl.87 (115th ed. 1995)), which, in my 
opinion, does not support her claims. 
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With the exception of specialists in family law and policy, few 
commentators dwelled much on state-sponsored marriage until the 
late 1990s, when the discussion grew too noisy to ignore. Federal wel­
fare reform enacted in 1996 attacked as pathological those families 
made up of low-income, unmarried mothers and their children.362 The 
federal Defense of Marriage Act and its isomorphs in the states ven­
tured for the first time into legal definitions of marriage. These proc­
lamations underscored marriage as Status, an institution that rests on 
fixed and immutable ascribed characteristics.363 "Covenant marriage" 
and related reforms began to make divorce harder to get.364 "Father­
hood initiatives" and other small-scale programs, first supported by 
federal grant money out of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(the program that replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children) 
and then by new appropriations, meddled overtly in private lives.365 
Antidivorce state-government spending flourished in bastions of mari­
tal breakdown like Oklahoma and Arkansas.366 For their part, gay ac­
tivists took up same-sex marriage to the exclusion of older causes, such 
as funding for the AIDS crisis and the expression of radical social cri­
tique.367 A well-funded movement soldiered in behalf of marriage, us­
ing surveys and other quasi-scientific means; one book, The Case for 
Marriage, has told readers that if they get with the program they will 
be healthy, wealthy, and wise. 
In short, observers of contemporary American law and policy re­
form have now been provoked. The more activists "pander to its mys­
tique,"368 the more state-sponsored marriage invites a citizen to con­
sider a challenge: Why marriage?369 Who needs it? Not children and 
their parents, with whom the state can deal separately. Not believers in 
the sanctity of marital union: such persons remain free to perform 
rituals celebrating the pair bond. Why shouldn't American law aban­
don the status of marriage - just as it has abandoned other notorious 
comprehensive personal statuses related to race, gender, and mental 
362. See supra Part 11.B.3. 
363. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
364. See supra Part 11.B.l. 
365. See supra Part 11.B. 3. 
366. Zaslow, supra note 28 (recounting the failure of these expenditures). 
367. See Martha M. Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage: An lnterSEXional Approach, 75 
DENY. U. L. REV. 1215, 1247-48 (1998) (noting "[q]ueer [t]heory [q]ualms [a]bout [s]ame­
[s]ex [m]arriage" and identifying political issues that the same-sex marriage endeavor can 
bury or overshadow). For an argument that activism on behalf of same-sex marriage is com­
patible with more radical agendas, see Barbara J. Cox, The Lesbian Wife: Same-Sex Marriage 
as an Expression of Radical and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 155 (1997). 
368. Post, supra note 19, at 283. 
369. Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 239 (2001). 
November 2003] For and Against Marriage 211 
condition - and allow the ordinary law of torts, property, crimes, and 
(especially) contracts to govern relations between adults? 
The answer cannot be found in the familiar "case for marriage." 
The marriage movement has installed marriage promotion as state and 
federal policy, and may have led some couples or individuals toward 
the license-and-ceremony route rather than a more casual affiliation 
like cohabitation. But it has failed to justify the existence of state­
sponsored marriage. Taking as fixed and unquestioned the gross fa­
voritism that the government lavishes on marriage (in its current 
opposite-sex, antipolygamous, officially sanctioned form), activists cite 
the prosperity of married persons to justify this law-based favoritism 
and argue for its extension. The project is propaganda, not reason or 
social science. It is specious to applaud marriage as better than its ab­
sence on the ground that married people are happier or healthier or 
richer or more fecund than unmarried people; these disparities in wel­
fare may derive from arbitrary laws that could be rewritten or re­
pealed. And even if marriage makes an individual better off, the socie­
tal stake in marriage requires a separate rationale, and on this point 
marriage-movement partisans have not gone beyond vague plati­
tudes.370 To entrust the entire case for marriage to the marriage 
movement risks missing better points, a deeper case. 
Accordingly, this Article has put state-sponsored marriage to a 
straightforward jurisprudential test. Referring to the writings of 
Jeremy Bentham and Oliver Wendell Holmes on government power, I 
have begun with the premise that any artifact of the law deserves to be 
abolished if it does not promote human well-being. This starting point 
fits the case for marriage into a study resembling cost-benefit analysis. 
While the benefits and detriments of marriage cannot be measured 
precisely, some counting is possible. After identifying the detriments 
of state-sponsored marriage, which this Article has laid out in three 
levels - "primary," through which the state forgoes or loses revenue 
that it would otherwise have; "secondary," through which the state 
contributes to a buildup of social losses; and "tertiary," through which 
norms and social meanings leave people worse off - one may con­
sider its benefits. 
370. See, e.g., supra note 112 (quoting a marriage-movement website); President Names 
Senior Advisor, supra note 134. In fairness to the marriage movement, its spokespersons 
may believe that this separate rationale is not necessary: if marriage is good for individuals, 
then in the aggregate it is good for society, because society consists of individuals. See gener­
ally Josie Huang, Census: Maine Eighth in the U.S. in Percentage of Divorced Residents, 
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 15, 2002, at lA (quoting David Popenoe in order to con­
nect divorce with poverty and juvenile crime). Nevertheless, the omission is crucial. Indi­
viduals must choose between marrying or not marrying, to the extent they have a choice. 
They cannot abolish marriage. Societies and systems, however, have the power to abandon 
recognition of marriage as a legal status. 
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Satisfactory arguments, it turns out, support state-sponsored mar­
riage as a comprehensive, capital-S personal Status, the legal artifice 
that Henry Maine pronounced dead or dying in 1861. At an individual 
level, marriage gives persons something valuable, enhancing the gains 
they achieve when they venture toward intimacy with another person. 
At a communal level, the space where law reform works, marriage is a 
valuable locus of political and social power, a counterweight: without 
marriage, the force that would expand to control citizens' private lives 
is either the state or capital, an unrelenting press of the market. No 
blithe, freeing, choice-affirming alternative to this extraordinary insti­
tution is available. Yet honest bookkeeping demands vigilance in aid 
of repair. The endeavor to mend marriage - that is, to fulfill its 
promises for the benefit of individuals and society, and to ameliorate 
its lingering ills and injustices - begins with recognition of the good 
that it achieves. 
